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  <title>BenEdelman.org</title> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/</link> 
  <description>Original research on Internet architecture and regulation.</description> 
  <language>en-us</language> 
  <copyright>Copyright 2003-2012 Ben Edelman</copyright> 
  <pubDate>30 Jan 2012 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <lastBuildDate>30 Jan 2012 12:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate> 

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  <pubDate>11 Jan 2012 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
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  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/03xx12-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Large-Scale Cookie-Stuffing at Eshop600.co.uk</title>
  <description>We present a cookie-stuffer notable for the volume of his attack and his attempts at obfuscation.</description> 
  <pubDate>30 Jan 2012 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/013012-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/013012-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Advertising Disclosures in Online Apartment Search</title>
  <description>
	&lt;p&gt;A decade ago, the FTC reminded search engines of their duty to label advertisements as such. Most general-purpose search engines now do so (though they're sometimes &lt;a href="http://www.benedelman.org/adlabeling/adlabeling.pdf"&gt;less than forthright&lt;/a&gt;). But practices at specialized search engines often fall far short.&lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;In today's posting, Paul Kominers and I examine leading online apartment search services and evaluate the disclosures associated with their paid listings. 
	We find paid placement and paid inclusion listings at each site, but disclosures range from limited to nonexistent. Where disclosures exist, they are largely 
	hidden behind multiple intermediate pages, effectively invisible to most users. We propose specific ways these sites could improve their disclosures, 
	and we flag their duties under existing law.&lt;/p&gt;
  </description> 
  <pubDate>25 Jan 2012 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/adlabeling/apartmentsearch/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/adlabeling/apartmentsearch/</link> 
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  <title>Google Tying Google Plus and Many More</title>
  <description>Google's new &quot;Google Search Plus Your World&quot; service favors Google Plus results at the expense of more popular social networks like Facebook and Twitter. These changes have prompted widespread concern, and rightly so. But in fact Google's dubious tying tactics extend well beyond Google Plus. I show Google using tying to favor all manner of its services, including using tying to force others to submit to Google's will even in areas where Google is not yet dominant. </description> 
  <pubDate>12 Jan 2012 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/011212-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/011212-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Revisiting Search Bias at Google</title>
  <description>Last week Joshua Wright posted a &lt;a href="http://www.laweconcenter.org/images/articles/definingmeasuring.pdf"&gt;critique&lt;/a&gt; of my January 2011 &lt;a href="http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/"&gt;Measuring Bias in 'Organic' Web Search&lt;/a&gt; (with Ben Lockwood). In this piece, I offer a brief &lt;a href="http://www.benedelman.org/news/111111-1.html"&gt;response&lt;/a&gt;.</description> 
  <pubDate>11 Nov 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/111111-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/111111-1.html</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>Understanding the Purposes – and Weaknesses – of Online-to-Offline Discounting</title>
  <description>&lt;p&gt;Daily deals sites often promise discounts exceeding 50% -- mobilizing millions of consumers spending billions of dollars. Yet this model faces growing resistance, particularly from merchants concerned that &quot;deals&quot; offers are unprofitable. The natural question: When and how are large discounts sustainable? &lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;Deals services seem to envision delivering new customers who return paying full price, yet they've done little to demonstrate that return visits actually occur. And there's reason to doubt whether customers  enticed by a discount will actually return to pay full price. I explore the implications, including the requirements for a profitable discounting model grounded in price discrimination rather than full-price return visits.&lt;/p&gt;
  </description> 
  <pubDate>26 Oct 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://pymnts.com/harvard-business-professor-reveals-the-biggest-daily-deals-losers/</guid> 
  <link>http://pymnts.com/harvard-business-professor-reveals-the-biggest-daily-deals-losers/</link> 
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  <title>Advertisers' Missing Perspective in the Google Antitrust Hearing</title>
  <description>This week's Senate Antitrust Subcommittee hearing promises to investigate persistent allegations of Google abusing its market power.  In these discussions, it's crucial to remember whose spending fuels Google's monopoly: advertisers.  Google is far from generous to advertisers -- burdening them with high pricing, harsh terms, and various restrictions that primarily serve Google's interests.  In this piece, I review worrisome practices regulators should investigate and, in due course, seek to prevent.</description> 
  <pubDate>20 Sep 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/092011-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/092011-1.html</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>Implications of Google's Pharmacy Debacle</title>
  <description>A DOJ investigation of Google's pharmaceutical advertising practices yielded a $500 million forfeiture and an admission of wrongdoing. More than that, the resulting documents prove Google's knowledge of, and participation in, advertising practices Google knew to be unlawful.    I explore the implications for other controversial conduct that remains widespread despite Google's promise to take action.  From deceptive ads to trademark, copyright, and more, Google's claims of innocence are increasingly difficult to believe.</description> 
  <pubDate>26 Aug 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/082611-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/082611-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Online Discount Vouchers - Letter-Writing Tool</title>
  <description>&lt;p&gt;Following up on &lt;a href="http://www.benedelman.org/voucher-consumer-protection/"&gt;my recent article about consumer protection problems in discount voucher sales&lt;/a&gt;, I've posted a letter-writing tool to help consumers resolve their voucher problems.  From expiration to cashback to day-of-week, time-of-day, and unexpected terms added after purchase, there are quite a few ways consumers can end up dissatisfied with the discount vouchers they buy.  Many voucher services offer refunds only if consumers complain vigorously.  Our tool helps consumers write concise but persuasive letters, including drawing on applicable state law where appropriate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Give it a try: &lt;a href="http://www.vouchercomplaints.org"&gt;Discount Voucher Problems – Letter-Writing Tool&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A special thanks to Paul Kominers and Xiaoxiao Wu, whose efforts brought this idea to fruition.&lt;/p&gt;</description> 
  <pubDate>2 Aug 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/080211-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/080211-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Consumer Protection in Online Discount Voucher Sales</title>
  <description>We evaluate five areas where online discount voucher services -- Groupon and similar sites -- risk falling afoul of applicable consumer protection law. We present applicable laws from selected states and evaluate compliance by voucher services and their affiliated merchants. We examine voucher services' attempts to limit their liability, and we explain why consumers and regulators should find current practices insufficient.</description> 
  <pubDate>14 Jun 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/voucher-consumer-protection/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/voucher-consumer-protection/</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>Revisiting Unlawful Advertisements at Google</title>
  <description>&lt;p&gt; Last week, Google's 10-Q &lt;a href="http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312511134428/d10q.htm"&gt;disclosed &lt;/a&gt; a $500 million charge for, the Wall Street Journal &lt;a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703730804576319572448399628.html"&gt;revealed&lt;/a&gt;, Google's sale of advertising to online pharmacies that break US laws. Kudos to the Department of Justice for holding Google accountable for these unlawful advertisements. But in fact there are numerous other categories where Google also shows, and has long shown, widespread deceptive advertisements. From &quot;free&quot; ringtones that aren't, to spyware/adware bundlers, to dubious mortgage modification schemes, deceptive ads are all too widespread. Google could and should do more to prevent these schemes and to avoid doing business with such advertisers. &lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.benedelman.org/news/051811-1.html"&gt;Continued: Categories of unlawful advertisements; Google's revenue; the scope of Google's involvement&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
	</description> 
  <pubDate>18 May 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/051811-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/051811-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Remedies for Search Bias</title>
  <description>In a forthcoming paper, I'll survey the problem of search bias -- search engines granting preferred placement and/or terms to their own links or to others' links chosen for improper purposes.  Today I'd like to focus on remedies -- what tactics a dominant search engine ought not employ due to their detrimental effects on competition, and how prohibiting those tactics would help assure fair competition in search and related businesses.</description> 
  <pubDate>22 Feb 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/022211-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/022211-1.html</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>In Accusing Microsoft, Google Doth Protest Too Much</title>
  <description>
  &lt;p&gt;Google this week sparked a media uproar by alleging that Microsoft Bing &quot;copies&quot; Google results. But is that actually the best characterization of what happened? In fact Google's engineers intentionally clicked bogus listings they had previously inserted into Google's results, and they did this on computers where they had specifically authorized Microsoft to examine their browsing in order to improve Bing. &lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;p&gt;Strikingly, Google's own Matt Cutts previously &lt;a href="http://www.webmasterworld.com/forum80/21-1-30.htm"&gt;endorsed&lt;/a&gt; the use of Toolbar and similar data to improve search results -- calling this approach &quot;a good idea.&quot; And Google's own Toolbar Privacy Policy allows Google to perform the same analysis Bing used. So I don't have much sympathy for Google's allegations of impropriety. Quite the contrary: With Bing's small market share, this data is important in improving Bing search results and building a viable competitor to Google's dominant search offering. &lt;/p&gt;
  </description> 
  <pubDate>3 Feb 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://blogs.hbr.org/hbsfaculty/2011/02/in-accusing-microsoft-google.html</guid> 
  <link>http://blogs.hbr.org/hbsfaculty/2011/02/in-accusing-microsoft-google.html</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>Measuring Bias in "Organic" Web Search</title>
  <description>&lt;p&gt;By comparing results between leading search engines, we identify patterns in their algorithmic search listings. We find that each search engine favors its own services in that each search engine links to its own services more often than other search engines do so. But some search engines promote their own services significantly more than others. We examine patterns in these differences, and we flag keywords where the problem is particularly widespread. &lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;p&gt;Even excluding "rich results" (whereby search engines feature their own images, videos, maps, etc.), we find that Google's algorithmic search results link to Google's own services more than three times as often as other search engines link to Google's services. &lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;p&gt;For selected keywords, biased results advance search engines' interests at users' expense: We demonstrate that lower-ranked listings for other sites sometimes manage to obtain more clicks than Google and Yahoo's own-site listings, even when Google and Yahoo put their own links first. &lt;/p&gt;
  </description> 
  <pubDate>19 Jan 2011 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>Knowing Certain Trademark Ads Were Confusing, Google Sold Them Anyway -- for $100+ Million</title>
  <description>Recently-released documents reveal Google's careful testing of consumer confusion resulting from certain uses of trademarks in advertisements. Google carefully measured consumers' understanding of trademark-triggered ads -- only to decide to loosen its policy when estimates revealed an opportunity $100 million to $1 billion of incremental annual revenue.</description> 
  <pubDate>30 Nov 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/113010-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/113010-1.html</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>Hard-Coding Bias in Google "Algorithmic" Search Results</title>
  <description>I present categories of searches for which available evidence indicates Google has "hard-coded" its own links to appear at the top of algorithmic search results, and I offer a methodology for detecting certain kinds of tampering by comparing Google results for similar searches. I compare Google's hard-coded results with Google's public statements and promises, including a dozen denials but at least one admission.  I conclude by analyzing the impact of Google's tampering on users and competition, and by proposing principles to block Google's bias. </description> 
  <pubDate>15 Nov 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/hardcoding/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/hardcoding/</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>A Closer Look at Google's Advertisement Labels</title>
  <description>The FTC has called for "clear and conspicuous disclosures" in search engines' advertisement labels, and the FTC specifically emphasized the need for "terms and a format that are easy for consumers to understand." Unfortunately, Google's new advertisement labels fail this test: Google's "Ads" label is the smallest text on the page, far too easily overlooked. (Indeed, the "Ads" label substantially fits within an "o" in "Google".) Meanwhile, Google now merges algorithmic and advertisement results merged within a single set of listings; Google's "Help" explanations are inaccurate; and Google uses inconsistent labels mere inches apart within search results, as well as across services.</description> 
  <pubDate>10 Nov 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/adlabeling/google-nov2010.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/adlabeling/google-nov2010.html</link> 
  </item>


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  <title>Labels and Disclosures in Search Advertising</title>
  <description>&lt;p&gt;Search engines have long labeled their advertisements with labels like &quot;Sponsored links&quot;, &quot;Sponsored results&quot;, and &quot;Sponsored sites.&quot; Do users actually know that these labels are intended to convey that the listings are paid advertisements? In a draft paper we're posting today, Duncan Gilchrist and I try to find out.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.benedelman.org/adlabeling/adlabeling.pdf"&gt;&quot;Sponsored Links&quot; or &quot;Advertisements&quot;?: Measuring Labeling Alternatives in Internet Search Engines&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;p&gt;In an online experiment, we measure users' interactions with search engines, both in standard configurations and in modified versions with improved labels identifying search engine advertisements. In particular, for a random subset of users, we change &quot;sponsored link&quot; labels to instead read &quot;paid advertisement.&quot; We find that users receiving the "paid advertisement" label click 25% to 33% fewer advertisements and correctly report that they click fewer advertisements, controlling for the number of advertisements they actually click. Results are most pronounced for commercial searches, and for users with low income, low education, and little online experience.&lt;/p&gt;
  </description> 
  <pubDate>9 Nov 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/110910-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/110910-1.html</link> 
  </item>


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  <title>Tying Google Affiliate Network</title>
  <description>In one of the few areas of Internet advertising where Google is not dominant – indeed, where just three years ago Google had no offering at all – Google now uses tying to achieve a position of dominance. Thanks to Google’s dominance in web search, Google offers preferred placement and superior terms to the advertisers who agree to use Google Affiliate Network (GAN). Competing affiliate networks cannot match these benefits, and Google's bundling strategy threatens to grant Google a position of power in yet another online advertising market.</description> 
  <pubDate>28 Sep 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/092810-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/092810-1.html</link>
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  <title>Facebook Leaks Usernames, User IDs, and Personal Details to Advertisers</title>
  <description>&lt;p&gt;Browse Facebook, and you wouldn't expect Facebook's advertisers to learn who you are. After all, Facebook's privacy policy and blog posts  promise not to share user data with advertisers except when users grant specific permission.	  &lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;p&gt;But in my testing, Facebook's actual practices exactly contradict Facebook's promises. Merely clicking an advertiser's ad reveals to the advertiser the user's Facebook username or user ID. With default privacy settings, the advertiser can then see almost all of a user's activity on Facebook, including name, photos, friends, and more.	  &lt;/p&gt;</description> 
  <pubDate>20 May 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/052010-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/052010-1.html</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>Sony's Crackle: Invisible Traffic Galore</title>
  <description>Advertisers buying display ads from Sony's Crackle.com rightly and reasonably expect that users can see the ads. But that's not always the case. In today's posting, I present three recent examples of Crackle partners loading the Crackle site invisibly, largely via 1x1 IFRAMEs. I then tabulate observations preserved by my automation, demonstrating that Crackle's tainted traffic has continued for more than a year. I conclude by flagging implications for traffic measurement and ad pricing, and by suggesting what Crackle should do to clean up this mess.</description> 
  <pubDate>27 Apr 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/042710-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/042710-1.html</link> 
  </item>

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  <title>Measuring Typosquatting Perpetrators and Funders</title>
  <description>&lt;p&gt;For more than a decade, aggressive website registrants have been engaged in 'typosquatting' -- the intentional registration of misspellings of popular website addresses. Uses for the diverted traffic have evolved over time, ranging from hosting &lt;a href="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archived_content/people/edelman/typo-domains/"&gt;sexually-explicit content&lt;/a&gt; to phishing. Several countermeasures have been implemented, including &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anticybersquatting_Consumer_Protection_Act"&gt;outlawing the practice&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a
	href="http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/"&gt;developing policies for resolving disputes&lt;/a&gt;. Despite these efforts, typosquatting remains rife. &lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;But just how prevalent is typosquatting today, and why is it so pervasive? &lt;a href="http://people.seas.harvard.edu/%7Etmoore/"&gt;Tyler Moore&lt;/a&gt; and I set out to answer exactly these questions. In &lt;a href="http://www.benedelman.org/typosquatting/typosquatting.pdf"&gt;Measuring the Perpetrators and Funders of Typosquatting&lt;/a&gt; (appearing at the &lt;a href="http://fc10.ifca.ai/"&gt;Financial Cryptography&lt;/a&gt; conference), we estimate that at least 938,000 typosquatting domains target the top 3,264 .com sites, and we crawl more than 285,000 of these domains to analyze their revenue sources.
	&lt;!--more--&gt;
	  &lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;Our full posting: &lt;a
	href="http://www.benedelman.org/typosquatting/typosquatting.pdf"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Measuring the Perpetrators and Funders of Typosquatting&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://www.benedelman.org/typosquatting/"&gt;web appendix&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
  </description> 
  <pubDate>17 Feb 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/typosquatting/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/typosquatting/</link> 
  </item>
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  <title>Google Toolbar Tracks Browsing Even After Users Choose "Disable"</title>
  <description>I present screenshots and screen-capture videos demonstrating that even after a user specifically chooses to &quot;disable&quot; the Google Toolbar, and even after the Google Toolbar disappears from view, Google Toolbar continues tracking users' web browsing -- including the specific sites visited, pages browsed, and searches conducted. I then critique Google's installation -- which lets users activate these transmissions in a single click, while ceasing the transmissions is much harder. I compare Google's current notice/consent process to Google's 2004 version, finding important decline in both presentation and clarity.</description> 
  <pubDate>26 Jan 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/012610-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/012610-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Upromise Savings -- At What Cost?</title>
  <description>When users install the Upromise toolbar, Upromise admits collecting &quot;non-personally identifiable information&quot; about users' online activities. But Upromise actually transmits detailed information -- not just page-views and searches, but email addresses and even full credit card numbers, expiration dates, and CVV2 codes. Upromise copies card numbers out of users' encrypted (HTTPS) browsing, but Upromise retransmits card numbers in plain text -- making it all too easy for others to gain access.</description> 
  <pubDate>21 Jan 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/012110-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/012110-1.html</link> 
  </item>
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  <title>Google Click Fraud Inflates Conversion Rates and Tricks Advertisers into Overpaying</title>
  <description>In today's post, I show click fraud with a twist. Like standard click fraud, this infraction 
    completely fakes clicks -- charging advertisers for clicks that didn't actually occur. But this click fraud is 
	carefully targeted -- faking a click to the victim advertiser when the user is already at that advertiser's site. 
	Thus, standard efforts to measure conversion rates  classify this traffic as legitimate and valuable -- tricking 
	advertisers into raising their bids and paying even more, when they should be demanding refunds.</description> 
  <pubDate>12 Jan 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/011210-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/011210-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Google Still Charging Advertisers for Conversion-Inflation Traffic from WhenU Spyware</title>
  <description>In February and May 2009, I reported Google paying WhenU spyware to cover selected sites with those sites' own Google PPC ads. These bogus placements perpetrate a practice I call "conversion inflation": They let Google claim credit for purchases that would have happened anyway -- overstating Google's effectiveness and leading advertisers to overbid and overpay for Google traffic.  Google admitted the impropriety of these placements -- even offering a credit to RCN, the advertiser I featured in May, though denying refund requests from other affected advertisers. But, remarkably, Google and its partners have restarted these placements. Today I post the proof -- screenshots, video, and packet log records prepared just this week.</description> 
  <pubDate>5 Jan 2010 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010510-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010510-1.html</link> 
  </item>
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  <title>Payment Card Network Rules Prohibit Aggressive Post-Transaction Tactics </title>
  <description>Post-transaction marketers crucially rely on automatic transfer of consumers' payment card numbers -- copying a customer's credit card number from a merchant (where the consumer intentionally made a purchase) to a post-transaction marketer's membership club (which typically attracts a consumer's attention with a deceptive offer promising illusory savings).  Copying credit card numbers raises numerous concerns, as detailed in my Statement for the Record last month. Crucially, it also violates applicable credit card network rules, which specifically prohibit merchants from copying card numbers.  In today's post, I cite, quote, and analyze relevant rules.  I also present letters I recently sent to leading card networks, urging them to enforce their existing rules.</description> 
  <pubDate>5 Dec 2009 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/posttransaction/cardnetworks/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/posttransaction/cardnetworks/</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Deception in Post-Transaction Marketing</title>
  <description>Post-transaction marketers have attracted criticism for solicitations that tend to deceive consumers.  Offers often promise a savings or discount while actually charging customers on an ongoing basis.  Offers often appear while customers are finishing the checkout process at trusted e-commerce sites -- a time when few users expect unrelated offers from third parties.  Furthermore, post-transaction marketers obtain consumers' credit card numbers from partner sites (without consumers providing their card numbers to the companies that actually post charges).  I summarize and post key documents recently released by the US Senate Commerce Committee, as well as reports from victims, an analysis by Committee staff, and recommendations from witness testimony (including my own).</description> 
  <pubDate>19 Nov 2009 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/posttransaction/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/posttransaction/</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Towards a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers</title>
  <description>I offer five rights to protect advertisers from increasingly powerful ad networks -- avoiding fraudulent charges for services not rendered, guaranteeing data portability so advertisers get the best possible value, and assuring price transparency so advertisers know what they're buying. I explain the need for these rights by presenting specific practices causing particular concern.</description> 
  <pubDate>21 Sep 2009 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/advertisersrights/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/advertisersrights/</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>How Google and Its Partners Inflate Measured Conversion Rates and Increase Advertisers' Costs</title>
  <description>I present four examples of Google and its partners interceding to grab users already on (or headed for) advertisers' sites -- spyware/adware popups, tricky toolbars, typosquatting, and Chrome browser autocomplete.  In each instance, Google charges advertisers for pay-per-click traffic they would have otherwise received for free.</description> 
  <pubDate>13 May 2009 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/051309-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/051309-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>In Support of Utah's HB450</title>
  <description>I analyze Utah's HB450, which would prohibit certain deceptive online advertising. I consider the bill's effects, and I explain why I support its approach.</description> 
  <pubDate>9 Mar 2009 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/030909-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/030909-1.html</link> 
  </item>

<item>
  <title>False and Deceptive Display Ads at Yahoo's Right Media</title>
  <description>Yahoo's Right Media ad marketplace features widespread ads exactly designed to deceive. I present ten examples of these deceptive ads, and I critique their unwelcome characteristics. To estimate the prevalence of deceptive tactics, I examine Right Media's own analysis ad characteristics -- finding that by Right Media's own admission, deceptive ads total 35% or more of Right Media's advertising inventory.</description> 
  <pubDate>14 Jan 2009 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/rightmedia-deception/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/rightmedia-deception/</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Privacy Lapse at Google JotSpot</title>
  <description>Google's JotSpot service posts sensitive user data, despite specific promises to the contrary in JotSpot's privacy policy. JotSpot even allows this information to be indexed by Google's search crawlers. JotSpot's postings are, by all indications, accidental. But in the context of a series of similar slip-ups, this error raises questions about the efficacy of Google's model of hosted applications.</description> 
  <pubDate>30 Oct 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/google-jot-privacy/</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/google-jot-privacy/</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Hydra Media's Pop-Up Problem -- Ten Examples</title>
  <description>Affiliate marketer Hydra Network claims to be tough on fraud.  But my AutoTester has seen Hydra affiliates receiving traffic from spyware or adware on fully 1,343 occasions. Today I'm posting ten examples -- ten different Hydra affiliates using five different spyware/adware programs to claim commissions from Hydra's top merchants.</description> 
  <pubDate>14 Oct 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/101408-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/101408-1.html</link> 
  </item>

<item>
  <title>CPA Advertising Fraud: Forced Clicks and Invisible Windows</title>
  <description>Not all CPA fraud requires placing (or using) spyware or adware on a user's PC. In today's article, I show three examples of affiliates cheating CPA merchants using only a web browser -- without any special software on users' PCs. In particular, I show affiliates running invisible IFRAMEs, hidden portions of banner ads, and redirects loaded through signature icons in forum discussions. In each instance, affiliate claim commissions they did not earn.</description> 
  <pubDate>7 Oct 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/100708-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/100708-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Auditing Spyware Advertising Fraud: Wasted Spending at VistaPrint</title>

  <description>This month and last, my AutoTester observed more than two dozen different affiliates cheating VistaPrint through spyware pop-ups -- in each instance, using &quot;self-targeting&quot; to claim affiliate commission on traffic VistaPrint would otherwise have received for free. In today's article, I offer six examples of these observations -- as well as some musings on what VistaPrint might do to block these scams.</description> 
  <pubDate>30 Sep 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/093008-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/093008-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Competition among Sponsored Search Services</title>

  <description>Last month I was invited to Congress about competition among paid search providers, particularly Google's proposed purchase of susbtantial advertising inventory from Yahoo.  At the last minute, the hearing was cancelled, and I won't be able to testify at the rescheduled session.  But I'm posting the prepared testimony I had planned to offer last month.</description> 
  <pubDate>11 Jul 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/071108-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/071108-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>PPC Platform Competition and Google's "May Not Copy" Restriction</title>
  <description>A little-noticed Google AdWords API Terms and Conditions restriction substantially hinders advertisers' efforts to use multiple providers -- prohibiting software vendors from using Google's API to help advertisers copy AdWords campaigns to competing platforms.  I present the restriction, analyze its effects, and critique the defense Google offers.</description> 
  <pubDate>27 Jun 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/062708-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/062708-1.html</link> 
  </item>

<item>
  <title>Running Out of Numbers? The Impending Scarcity of IPv4 Addresses and What To Do About It</title>
  <description>The Internet's current IPv4 numbering system is nearing exhaustion, and transition incentives hinder rapid v6 deployment.  In that context, I present market mechanisms to reallocate existing v4 addresses and facilitate continued use of v4. In particular, I consider the possible effects of paid transfers of v4 addresses. I emphasize rules to ameliorate the worst effects of v4 scarcity, while preserving the core principles of existing regulation and avoiding major negative externalities.</description> 
  <pubDate>6 Jun 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/060608-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/060608-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Debunking Zango's "Content Economy"</title>
  <description>I examine Zango's media library.  I find widespread copyrighted videos presented without any indication of license from the corresponding rights-holders.  I also find widespread sexually-explicit material, including prominent explicit material nowhere labeled as such.</description> 
  <pubDate>28 May 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/052808-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/052808-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Coupons.com and TRUSTe: Lots of Talk, Too Little Action</title>
  <description>Coupons.com continues to use deceptive filenames and registry keys that falsely indicate they're part of Windows -- some 6+ months after I uncovered this practice.  Although TRUSTe last month announced that Coupons.com had stopped these practices, my tests indicate exactly the contrary.  Furthermore, I show other ongoing violations by Coupons.com -- including incomplete uninstall and executable code left behind after an uninstall.</description> 
  <pubDate>18 Mar 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031808-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031808-1.html</link> 
  </item>

<item>
  <title>Delaying Payment to Deter Online Advertising Fraud</title>
  <description>I introduce an alternative method of fraud prevention for certain online advertising systems. By delaying payments, a merchant or network differentially harms bad affiliates (who rightly worry they may get caught) without unduly harming good affiliates (who know they'll get paid, and who receive a bonus in compensation for the delay). With a suitable delay, a merchant or network can deter many bad affiliates while retaining the good.</description> 
  <pubDate>10 Mar 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031008-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031008-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Critiquing C-NetMedia's Anti-Spyware Offerings and Advertising Practices</title>
  <description>I examine anti-spyware software from C-NetMedia. I show deceptive advertising for C-Net's products, including  product names, ad text, and web site designs that falsely suggest affiliation with security industry leaders. I examine C-Net's use of many disjoint product names -- preventing consumers from easily learning more about C-Net, its reputation, and its practices. I analyze C-Net's high-pressure sales tactics, including false positives, which overstate the urgency of paying for an upgraded version.</description> 
  <pubDate>14 Feb 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/021408-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/021408-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Sears Exposes Customer Purchase History in Violation of Its Privacy Policy </title>
  <description>I show that Sears' ManageMyHome site provides detailed customer purchase data without effective security measures.</description> 
  <pubDate>4 Jan 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010408-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010408-1.html</link> 
  </item>

<item>
  <title>The Sears "Community" Installation of ComScore</title>
  <description>I critique a Sears installation of ComScore software without meaningful notice or consent.  I present the entire installation sequence in screenshots and video, then explain why the limited notice falls far short of applicable FTC standards. I also show that Sears' claims of adequate notice are demonstrably false.</description> 
  <pubDate>1 Jan 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010108-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010108-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>A Closer Look at Coupons.com</title>
  <description>I examine software from Coupons.com.  Key findings: Coupons.com disguises some of its key files to make them look like they're part of Windows.  These files stay on disk even if a user requests removal of Coupons.com.  Coupons.com prints a user ID on each coupon, without any meaningful disclosure in its privacy policy.  Any web site can use simple JavaScript to retrieve a user's Coupons.com user ID.  Given a user ID, any person can check whether a user has printed a given coupon -- revealing sensitive information about users' purchasing interests.</description> 
  <pubDate>28 Aug 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/082807-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/082807-1.html</link> 
  </item>
<item>
  <title>Zango's Compliance Problems</title>
  <description>Despite Zango's 2006 settlement with the FTC, Zango continues behaviors exactly contrary to what the settlement specifies -- including installations lacking out-of-EULA disclosure of Zango's material terms, and including unlabeled ads that don't tell users why the ads appeared or how to make them stop.  I document these and other troubling behaviors in a series of screenshots and videos.</description> 
  <pubDate>31 Jul 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/073107-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/073107-1.html</link> 
  </item>

<item>
  <title>ComScore Doesn't Always Get Consent</title>
  <description>I describe multiple recent ComScore RelevantKnowledge installations that occur without user consent. I provide video proof of one such installation. I compare these installations with applicable law and with TRUSTe Trusted Download rules.</description> 
  <pubDate>29 Jun 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/062907-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/062907-1.html</link> 
  </item>
  
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