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  <title>BenEdelman.org</title> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/</link> 
  <description>Original research on Internet architecture and regulation.</description> 
  <language>en-us</language> 
  <copyright>Copyright 2003-2008 Ben Edelman</copyright> 
  <pubDate>18 Mar 2008 12:01:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <lastBuildDate>18 Mar 2008 12:01:00 GMT</lastBuildDate> 
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  <pubDate>xx Mar 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
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  <title>Coupons.com and TRUSTe: Lots of Talk, Too Little Action</title>
  <description>Coupons.com continues to use deceptive filenames and registry keys that falsely indicate they're part of Windows -- some 6+ months after I uncovered this practice.  Although TRUSTe last month announced that Coupons.com had stopped these practices, my tests indicate exactly the contrary.  Furthermore, I show other ongoing violations by Coupons.com -- including incomplete uninstall and executable code left behind after an uninstall.</description> 
  <pubDate>18 Mar 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031808-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031808-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Delaying Payment to Deter Online Advertising Fraud</title>
  <description>I introduce an alternative method of fraud prevention for certain online advertising systems. By delaying payments, a merchant or network differentially harms bad affiliates (who rightly worry they may get caught) without unduly harming good affiliates (who know they'll get paid, and who receive a bonus in compensation for the delay). With a suitable delay, a merchant or network can deter many bad affiliates while retaining the good.</description> 
  <pubDate>10 Mar 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031008-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031008-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Critiquing C-NetMedia's Anti-Spyware Offerings and Advertising Practices</title>
  <description>I examine anti-spyware software from C-NetMedia. I show deceptive advertising for C-Net's products, including  product names, ad text, and web site designs that falsely suggest affiliation with security industry leaders. I examine C-Net's use of many disjoint product names -- preventing consumers from easily learning more about C-Net, its reputation, and its practices. I analyze C-Net's high-pressure sales tactics, including false positives, which overstate the urgency of paying for an upgraded version.</description> 
  <pubDate>14 Feb 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/021408-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/021408-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Sears Exposes Customer Purchase History in Violation of Its Privacy Policy </title>
  <description>I show that Sears' ManageMyHome site provides detailed customer purchase data without effective security measures.</description> 
  <pubDate>4 Jan 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010408-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010408-1.html</link> 
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  <title>The Sears "Community" Installation of ComScore</title>
  <description>I critique a Sears installation of ComScore software without meaningful notice or consent.  I present the entire installation sequence in screenshots and video, then explain why the limited notice falls far short of applicable FTC standards. I also show that Sears' claims of adequate notice are demonstrably false.</description> 
  <pubDate>1 Jan 2008 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010108-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/010108-1.html</link> 
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  <title>A Closer Look at Coupons.com</title>
  <description>I examine software from Coupons.com.  Key findings: Coupons.com disguises some of its key files to make them look like they're part of Windows.  These files stay on disk even if a user requests removal of Coupons.com.  Coupons.com prints a user ID on each coupon, without any meaningful disclosure in its privacy policy.  Any web site can use simple JavaScript to retrieve a user's Coupons.com user ID.  Given a user ID, any person can check whether a user has printed a given coupon -- revealing sensitive information about users' purchasing interests.</description> 
  <pubDate>28 Aug 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/082807-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/082807-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Zango's Compliance Problems</title>
  <description>Despite Zango's 2006 settlement with the FTC, Zango continues behaviors exactly contrary to what the settlement specifies -- including installations lacking out-of-EULA disclosure of Zango's material terms, and including unlabeled ads that don't tell users why the ads appeared or how to make them stop.  I document these and other troubling behaviors in a series of screenshots and videos.</description> 
  <pubDate>31 Jul 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/073107-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/073107-1.html</link> 
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  <title>ComScore Doesn't Always Get Consent</title>
  <description>I describe multiple recent ComScore RelevantKnowledge installations that occur without user consent. I provide video proof of one such installation. I compare these installations with applicable law and with TRUSTe Trusted Download rules.</description> 
  <pubDate>29 Jun 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/062907-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/062907-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Spyware Still Cheating Merchants and Legitimate Affiliates</title>
  <description>I post six examples of affiliates using spyware to claim commission on organic traffic to Blockbuster and Netflix.  As usual, I offer screenshots, videos, and annotated packet logs to confirm what occurred. I conclude with strategies for detection and prevention.</description> 
  <pubDate>21 May 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/052107-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/052107-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Introducing the Automatic Spyware Advertising Tester</title>
  <description>I describe my new program for automated detection of spyware-based advertising fraud.</description> 
  <pubDate>21 May 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/052107-2.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/052107-2.html</link> 
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  <title>How Spyware-Driven Forced Visits Inflate Web Site Traffic Counts </title>
  <description>I post six examples of web sites receiving spyware-originating forced-visit popups.  I discuss how these popups cause traffic measurement systems to overstate site popularity.</description> 
  <pubDate>7 May 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/050707-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/050707-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Advertising Through Spyware -- After Promising To Stop</title>
  <description>I post six examples of ongoing Cingular (AT&amp;T) and Travelocity advertising through spyware -- notable in light of recent New York Attorney General settlements that specifically oblige these companies to cease spyware advertising.</description> 
  <pubDate>14 Mar 2007 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031407-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/031407-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Bad Practices Continue at Zango, Notwithstanding Proposed FTC Settlement and Zango's Claims</title>
  <description>In a joint piece with Eric Howes, I show numerous specific examples of ongoing Zango practices inconsistent with Zango's proposed settlement with the FTC.  I include installations with no consent at all, as well as installations without prominent disclsoure of material effects (as required by the proposed settlement).  I also show ongoing unlabeled Zango ads (again contrary to the proposed settlement).</description> 
  <pubDate>20 Nov 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/112006-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/112006-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Intermix Revisited</title>
  <description>I report the outcome of recent litigation against Intermix, including my investigations and findings.  I provide video proof of ongoing, recent nonconsensual installations of Intermix software.</description> 
  <pubDate>8 Nov 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/110806-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/110806-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Current Practices of IAC/Ask Toolbars</title>
  <description>I assess current practices of Ask toolbars -- including soliciting installations through kids sites and through other vendors' spyware, and installing without any user notice or consent whatsoever.  I assess Ask's installation solicitations under governing law, including the FTC's "deceptive door opener" precedents that prohibit misleading initial offers even when ultimately corrected by subsequent statements.</description> 
  <pubDate>16 Oct 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/101606-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/101606-1.html</link> 
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  <title>False and Deceptive PPC Ads</title>
  <description>I present pay-per-click ads from more than two dozen different advertisers, all including false or materially deceptive claims. Often, ads claim that their offerings are "free" when they're not.  I cite applicable FTC regulations that prohibit these practices.  I then brainstorm about how much profit these ads bring to Google and how Google could take action if it chose to do so.</description> 
  <pubDate>9 Oct 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/100906-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/100906-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Certifications and Site Trustworthiness</title>
  <description>I compare the safety of sites certified by leading certification issuer TRUSTe with other top sites not certified.  I find the TRUSTe-certified sites more than twice as likely to be untrustworthy, a result that holds when I control for site popularity, complexity, and other characteristics.</description> 
  <pubDate>25 Sep 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/092506-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/092506-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Which Anti-Spyware Programs Delete Which Cookies?</title>
  <description>I test leading anti-spyware programs to see which detect cookies from major advertising networks.  I find some networks' cookies detected by most scanners, but others (including Google) escape detection altogether.  I report my raw results in full detail, along with a calculator by which affiliates and networks can estimate likely revenue losses due to cookie deletion.</description> 
  <pubDate>13 Sep 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/091306-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/091306-1.html</link> 
  </item>
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  <title>How Vonage Funds Spyware</title>
  <description>I present a dozen recent examples of Vonage ads appearing in spyware.  Beyond the usual spyware-delivered pop-ups, I show spyware-injected ads -- placing ads into sites without those sites' permission and without payment to those sites, in one instance specifically replacing an ad a site had intended to show.</description> 
  <pubDate>18 July 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/071806-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/071806-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Spyware Showing Unrequested Sexually-Explicit Images</title>
  <description>I show several examples of spyware programs presenting users with unrequested sexually-explicit images.  I determine what spyware programd and what ad networks are involved in these practices.  I present screenshots, packet logs, and even video proof.</description> 
  <pubDate>22 June 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/062206-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/062206-1.html</link> 
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  <title>Banner Farms in the Crosshairs</title>
  <description>I critique practices of banner farm "Hula Direct" -- showing how they buy ads from notorious spyware vendors, then send that traffic to advertisers via convoluted banner ad networks.  I further show how they automatically reload ads to increase their revenues.  I list specific advertisers and ad networks involved in these practices.</description> 
  <pubDate>12 June 2006 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate> 
  <guid>http://www.benedelman.org/news/061206-1.html</guid> 
  <link>http://www.benedelman.org/news/061206-1.html</link> 
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