FCC Comment on Expanding Consumers’ Video Navigation Choices

Disclosure: I serve as a consultant to various companies that compete with Google. I filed the underlying FCC comment at the request of the Future of TV Coalition. But no client directed my comment or had the right to revise it before submission.

Today I filed comments in the FCC’s ongoing proceeding Expanding Consumers’ Video Navigation Choices. The FCC calls the initiative "unlock the box" — allowing consumers to buy set-top boxes from any of a variety of competitive manufacturers, not just leasing from their cable companies.

On one hand, the FCC’s proposal benefits from favorable experience three decades ago. It’s hard to overstate the benefits of the 1982 FCC rule that granted consumers the right to supply their own telephone equipment — crucially including fax machines and modems.

But in the context of set-top boxes, the FCC’s approach would have implications far beyond hardware design and user interface. As I point out in my comment, alternative set-top boxes might add new forms of advertising — not just in channel guides, but in prerolls, superimposed panels, and even insertions within commercial breaks. Meanwhile alternative set-top boxes could even remove existing advertising — a particularly serious intrusion into the advertising-based model of most television programming. These tactics would undermine the basic business model and value exchange of advertising-supported video programming. What advertiser would pay top dollar to advertise in a television show if widely-used alternative set-top boxes remove the ad and substitute other ads for, no doubt, the advertiser’s direct competitors?

As it turns out, the FCC is well aware of these problems. In the FCC’s February 18, 2016 Open Commission Meeting, Ars Technica’s Jon Brodkin asked FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler about advertising issues. Their exchange:

Q: I want to ask about the issue of advertising in third-party set top boxes. You said nothing will change that. What prevents a set top box maker from putting advertising in? …

A: The rule will prohibit it. You need to have the sanctity of the content. Nobody is going to insert ads into it. Nobody is going to make a split screen where they’re putting ads next to it. Nobody is going to say it’s a frame around it, where you can say “Go to Joe’s Auto Repair.” It’s going to require the sanctity of the content be passed through unchanged.

Q: Does that include the neighborhood agreements?

A: Programming agreements are included. Programming agreements are part of the sanctity of the content. … That’s still there.

Q: So the rule will specifically prohibit extra advertising?

A: Yes sir.

(See minute 129 of the meeting video.)

Despite the clarity of Wheeler’s response, the FCC’s NPRM provides no such assurance — zero protection whatsoever against extra advertising or, for that matter, removal of existing advertising. One might that hope principles of copyright would disallow those tactics. But copyright law has struggled to address intermediaries that insert and remove advertising. (Consider a decade of adware cases, where advertisers’ ads often covered their competitors’ sites.) So if the FCC is silent on the permissibility of adding, removing, or changing advertising, it’s likely that new boxes will attempt all those methods.

Relatedly, the FCC’s proposal offers disproportionate benefits to Google, whose dominance is at this point beyond dispute. For one, Google could offer an alternative set-top box that delivers advertisements targeted based on users’ activities in Google Search, Gmail, Maps, and more. Furthermore, Google’s lawyers have taken expansive views of fair use — making them particularly well-positioned to argue the permissibility of removing other companies’ advertisements and inserting their own. To date, television has been one of the few electronic advertising spheres where Google is not dominant — so if the FCC’s approach helps Google grow there, advertisers dissatisfied with the company would have even fewer alternatives.

My bottom-line: Whatever innovations and cost-savings might result from alternative set-top boxes, I don’t see how they can outweigh the clear concerns in advertising, copyright, program integrity, and competition.

Further details in my full comments to the FCC:

Comment on Expanding Consumers’ Video Navigation Choices – Benjamin Edelman – May 23, 2016.

Uber Overcharges, Spring 2016

While claiming price advantages over taxis, Uber overcharges consumers by withholding promised discounts and credits. In today’s post, I examine a set of Uber pricing guffaws — each, a breach of the company’s own unambiguous written commitments — that have overcharged consumers for months on end. Taken together, these practices call into question Uber’s treatment of consumers, the company’s legal and compliance processes, and its approach to customer service and dispute resolution.

A "free ride" or a $15 discount?

Uber offers 'free rides' when users refer friends. Uber offers "free rides" when users refer friends.

Uber specifically confirms that the friend's 'first ride' is free, while the existing user gets 'a free ride (up to $15).'Uber specifically confirms that the friend’s "first ride" is free, while the existing user gets "a free ride (up to $15)."

Uber asks existing users to refer friends — promising significant sign up bonuses to both new and existing users for each referral. First, the existing user activates the Free Rides function in the Uber app, revealing the offer and a code that the new user must enter so Uber can track the referral. Quoting from the first screenshot at right (emphasis added):

Share your invite code [placeholder]. Send friends free rides and you’ll get one too, worth $15! Details. INVITE FRIENDS.

A user who taps "Details" sees two additional sentences (quoting from the second screenshot at right):

Share your promo code with friends and they’ll get their first ride free. Once they’ve tried Uber, you’ll automatically get a free ride (up to $15) the next time you use Uber. CLOSE.

Neither screen provides any menu, link, button, or other command offering more details about other requirements or conditions. The text quoted above is the entirety of Uber’s offer.

Uber’s promise is clear — a "first ride free" for the new user, and a "free ride (up to $15)" for the existing user. But Uber’s actual practice is quite different. Most notably, the new user’s "free ride" is also limited to a $15 discount. One might ask whether the "worth $15" in the first screen applies to the friend’s free ride or to the existing user’s free ride or perhaps both. But the Details screen leaves no doubt that this limitation applies only to the existing user. Notice the placement of the "up to $15" parenthetical only in the sentence describing the existing user’s free ride. In contrast, the separate sentence about the new user’s ride promises "their first ride free" with no indication of any maximum value.

These discrepancies create unfortunate surprises for typical Uber customers. Consider the standard workflow. An existing Uber user tells a friend about Uber and, in person, helps the new user install the app and create an account, including entering the existing user’s referral code when prompted. "You’ll get a free ride," the existing user explains, guided by Uber’s simple on-screen offer. The new user then takes an expensive ride; expecting the ride to be free (as promised), the new user might choose Uber for a distance that would otherwise have been a better fit for a train or bus, or the new user might accept a high surge multiplier. Only later does the new user learn that according to Uber, "free" actually meant a $15 discount. The user would have no written evidence of Uber’s "free ride" promise, which was conveyed orally by the existing user. So the new user is unlikely to complain — and my experience (detailed below) indicates that a request to Uber is unlikely to get satisfaction.

I know about these problems because of an experience referring a friend — call her my cousin — in January 2016. I told her she’d get a free ride, but her receipt showed no such benefit. In fact she took her first ride in another country, which prompted me to check for other discrepancies between Uber’s marketing statements and its actual practice.

Piecing together statements from Uber’s support staff and the various disclosures in Uber’s Android, iOS, and mobile web apps, I found five separate restrictions that were not mentioned mentioned anywhere in Uber’s new user offer as presented to existing Android users:

  • The new user’s credit only applies to a ride in the country that Uber designates as the new user’s home country or the currency that Uber designates as the new user’s home currency. But Uber’s signup page doesn’t ask about a user’s home country or currency. As best I can tell, Uber automatically sets a user’s home country based on the user’s IP address or location at the time of signup. (Source: Uber staff indicated that "the promo is currency specific" in explaining why my cousin received no discount on her first ride.)
  • The existing user’s credit can only be redeemed towards a ride in the country that Uber designates as the existing user’s home country. (Source: Uber’s iOS app, GET FREE RIDES offer, secondary disclosure screen, stating that "discounts apply automatically in your country," emphasis added.)
  • The new user’s maximum ride value varies by country. Not only is there a maximum value (contrary to the simple "first ride free" in Uber’s second screen above), but the maximum value is not mentioned to the existing user. (Source: Uber’s iOS app, GET FREE RIDES offer, secondary disclosure screen; and mobile web, new user offer, page footer.)
  • All discounts expire three months from issue date. (Source: Uber’s iOS app, GET FREE RIDES offer, secondary disclosure screen.)
  • Offer is not valid for UberTaxi. (Source: Uber’s iOS app, GET FREE RIDES offer, secondary disclosure screen; and mobile web, GET FREE RIDES offer, page footer.)

The table below presents the Uber’s marketing offers in all three platforms, along with the errors I see in each:

  Android iOS Mobile Web
Primary disclosure FREE RIDES. Share your invite code [placeholder]. Send friends free rides and you’ll get one too, worth $15! Details. INVITE FRIENDS. GET FREE RIDES. They get a free ride and you will too (worth up to $15), after their first ride. Details. GET FREE RIDES. Sign up now to claim your free gift from [placeholder] ($15 off first ride)*.
Secondary disclosure Share your promo code with friends and they’ll get their first ride free. Once they’ve tried Uber, you’ll automatically get a free ride (up to $15) the next time you use Uber. CLOSE.

Every time a new Uber user signs up with your invite code, they’ll get their first ride free (value amounts vary by location).

Once they take their first ride, you’ll automatically get your next ride free (worth up to $15).

Discounts apply automatically in your country and expire 3 months from their issue date. Offer not valid for uberTAXI.

Every time a friend signs up with your invite code, they’ll get their first ride free (value amounts vary by country). Once they use it, you’ll automatically get a free ride to use the next time you Uber (worth up to $15). Offer not valid for UberTaxi.
Errors

New user’s ride is actually limited to $15 (or other amounts in other countries). In contrast, both disclosures indicate that there is no limit to the value of the new user’s ride.

Discount only applies to a new user’s first ride in the user’s home country as determined by Uber.

Existing user’s discount can only be redeemed in existing user’s home country.

Discounts for both the new and existing user expire three months from issue date.

Offer is not valid for UberTaxi.

Secondary disclosure plausibly contradicts primary disclosure: Primary disclosure promised "a free ride" for the new user, while secondary disclosure retracts "free ride" and instead offers only a discount. In contrast, FTC rules allow secondary disclosures only to clarify, not to contradict prior statements.

Discount only applies to a new user’s first ride in the user’s home country as determined by Uber.

Discount only applies to a new user’s first ride in the user’s home country as determined by Uber.

Existing user’s discount can only be redeemed in existing user’s home country.

Discounts for both the new and existing user expire three months from issue date.

I first alerted Uber staff to these discrepancies in January 2016. It was a difficult discussion: My inquiries were bounced among four different support representatives, with a different person replying every time and no one addressing the substance of my messages. So I reluctantly gave up.

Six weeks later, a different Uber rep replied out of the blue. He seemed to better understand the problem, and I managed to get two separate replies from him. At my request, he committed to "pass this along to the appropriate team." That said, he did not respond to my repeated suggestion that Uber needed to refund affected consumers.

Eight weeks after my final correspondence with the fifth Uber representative and sixteen weeks after I first alerted Uber to the problem, I see no improvement. Uber’s Android app still makes the same incorrect statements about promotion benefits, verbatim identical to what I observed in January.

Credit on your "next trip" — or later, or not at all

Uber claimed I'd get a 'credit' on my 'next trip.' Uber claimed I’d get a "credit" on my "next trip." In fact, the credit seems to apply only to a future trip in the same country where the problem occurred.

In a variety of circumstances, Uber responds to customer complaints by issuing credits towards a customer’s "next trip." For example, during a recent attempt to ride with Uber in Mexico, I was unable to find or contact the driver. (I was where the on-screen pushpin told me to be, and GPS seemingly told the driver he was where he was supposed to be, but we just couldn’t find each other.) I later received an email receipt showing that I had been charged a cancellation fee. In Uber’s "Help" area, I used Uber’s "I was charged a cancellation fee" feature, and I was immediately advised (emphasis added):

We’ve credited your Uber account. Thanks for letting us know what happened. A credit has been added to your Uber account. This credit will apply to your next trip.

Imagine my surprise when, upon returning to the US a few hours later, I took another Uber ride but received no such credit.

It seems Uber’s notion of credits is in fact country-specific or currency-specific. My problem resulted from difficulty finding a driver in Mexico, where I don’t live and rarely travel. Far from applying the credit on my "next trip," it seems Uber’s systems will carry the credit forward to my next journey in Mexico. (See Uber’s Payment screen, "Credit Balances" section, showing the amount of the cancellation fee as a credit in the currency associated with the country where that fee was charged.) But this is much less useful to users traveling internationally. For example, Uber might impose a time limit on the credit — analogous to Uber’s undisclosed three month limit for use of a "free ride" credit (as revealed in the preceding section). And some users may never return to (or never again take Uber rides in) certain countries or currencies. The plain language of "your next trip" of course purports to protect users against all these contingencies; "your next trip" means a trip denominated in any currency, perhaps soon but perhaps indefinitely in the future. Uber’s actual practice is plainly less favorable to consumers.

Here too, predictable consumer responses increase the harm from Uber’s approach. If a consumer was charged improperly and felt Uber’s response was out of line, the consumer might pursue a credit card chargeback. But when Uber tells the consumer "We’ve credited your Uber account" and "This credit will apply to your next trip," there’s every reason to think the problem is completely fixed. Then the consumer may forget about the problem; certainly the consumer is less likely to diligently check future Uber receipts for a credit that was slated to be automatic and guaranteed. In addition, consumers are vulnerable to the passing of time: If a consumer rides with Uber only occasionally, the permissible time for a chargeback may have elapsed by the time the consumer’s next ride.

Update (May 25, 2016): Four weeks after I reported this discrepancy to Uber, I received a reply from an Uber representative. He confirmed that I did not receive the promised credit for the general reason I described above — a credit provided in one currency, while my next trips was in a different currency. I reminded him that Uber’s statements to users say nothing of any such restriction. I also pointed out that Uber is capable of converting currencies, and I encouraged him to assure that other users, similarly situated, are appropriately refunded. So far as I know, Uber has not done so.

Others’ reports

Checking with friends and colleagues, and receiving further reports from strangers, I’ve learned about a fair number of other Uber billing errata. For example, one user confidently reported that when a driver cancels a ride — perhaps seeing a surge in another app, getting lost, learning that the passenger’s destination is inconvenient, or just changing his or her mind — Uber still charges the passenger a cancellation fee. I haven’t been able to verify this, as I don’t have an easy way to cause a driver to cancel. But in the Uber help tool, the "I was charged a cancellation fee" menu offers as one of its preset reasons for complaint "My driver cancelled" — confirming that Uber’s systems charge cancellation fees to passengers when drivers cancel. Of course Uber’s systems can distinguish who pressed the cancel button, plus Uber could ask a driver the reason for cancellation. I see no proper reason for Uber ever to charge a passenger a cancelation fee if it is the driver who elected to cancel.

Users with experience with this problem, or other Uber contracting or billing errata, should feel free to contact me. I’ll add their experiences here or in a follow-up.

Update (June 4): Readers alerted me to UberPool drivers repeatedly charging for two passengers purportedly riding, when only one passenger was actually present, increasing the charge to passengers.

Update (June 4): In federal litigation against Uber, blind passenger Tiffany Jolliff reports that not only did multiple Uber drivers refuse to transport her and her service dog, but Uber charged her a cancellation fee each time a driver refused to transport her.

Lessons from Uber’s billing errors

I see four distinct takeaways from these billing errors. First, Uber’s engineering, testing, and legal teams need to sharpen their focus on billing, promotions, and credits. The coding of a promotional offer is inextricably linked to the marketing text that describes the offer. Similarly, the coding of a customer service benefit must match the text that explains the benefit to users. Both should be checked by attorneys who specialize in advertising law and consumer protection. Instead, in the problems I described here, Uber’s billing logic seems to be entirely separate from the text presented to consumers. It is particularly striking to see Uber’s three separate textual descriptions of the new user promotion — all three of them incorrect, yet in three different ways. Even a basic attorney review would have flagged the discrepancies and identified the need to inquire further. An advanced attorney review, fully attuned to FTC disclosure rules, might also question what appears in the primary disclosure versus the secondary disclosure. Attorneys might reasonably caution Uber against repeatedly and prominently promising "FREE RIDES" when the company’s actual offer is a discount.

Second, Uber’s overcharging is both large and long-lasting. I reported the new user promotion problems in January 2016, although they probably began considerably earlier. (Perhaps Uber will respond to this article by determining, and telling the public, when the problems began.) In response to this article, I expect that Uber will fix these specific problems promptly. But given Uber’s massive operations — many thousands of new users per month — the aggregate harm is plausibly well into the millions of dollars.

Third, my experience calls into question whether Uber’s customer service staff are up to the task of investigating or resolving these problems. Writing in to customer service is fruitless; even with screenshots proving the discrepancy in the new user promotion, Uber was slow to promise a refund to match the marketing commitment. (It took five separate messages over eight weeks!) In fact, even after promising the refund in a message of March 16, 2016, that refund never actually occurred. Similarly, I promptly alerted Uber to the "next ride" credit not provided — but ten days later, I have received neither the promised credit nor any reply. Others have reported the shortfalls of Uber’s customer service staff including ineffective responses, a focus on response speed rather than correctness, and insufficient training. My experience suggests that these problems are genuine and ongoing. Users with the most complicated problems — Uber system flaws, discrepancies between records, billing errors — appear to be particularly unlikely to achieve resolution.

Finally, users lack meaningful recourse in responding to Uber’s overcharges. In each of the problems I found, Uber is overcharging a modest amount to each of many thousands of customers. Ordinarily, this would be a natural context for class action litigation, which would allow a single judge and a single set of lawyers to figure out what happened and how to set things right. But Uber’s Terms and Conditions purport to disallow users to sue Uber at all, instead requiring arbitration. Furthermore, Uber claims to disallow group arbitration, instead requiring that each consumer bring a separate claim. That’s inefficient and uneconomical. Uber’s arbitration clause thus provides a de facto free pass against litigation and legal remedies. Of course many companies use arbitration to similarly immunize themselves against consumer claims. But Uber’s controversial activities, including the overbilling described here among many other disputes, give consumers extra reason to seek judicial oversight.

Next steps

Just last week, Uber formed a paid advisory board of ex-regulators, most with competition and consumer protection expertise. These experts should exercise independent judgment in looking into the full breadth of Uber’s problems. I doubt overbilling was previously on their agenda, but my experience suggests it should be. To investigate, they might review all customer service threads with five or more messages, plus look for all messages attaching screenshots or mentioning "overcharge" or "promised" or "contract." Tthey shouldn’t rely merely on Uber staff summaries of customer experience; with an advisory board of superstars, the group should bring independent judgment to assessing and improving the company’s approach.

Meanwhile, Uber’s response should include a full refund to each and every user who was overcharged. For example, when Uber promised a "free ride" to an Android user who in turn referred a friend, Uber should provide the friend with a refund to achieve exactly that — not just the $15 discount that may be what Uber intended but isn’t what the offer actually said. Since Uber may be disinclined to offer these refunds voluntarily, I’m alerting consumer protection and transportation regulators in appropriate jurisdictions to help push to get users what they were promised.

EC Statement of Objections on Google’s Tactics in Mobile

Today the European Commission announced a Statement of Objections to Google’s approach to Android mobile licensing and applications. Broadly, the EC’s concerns arise from Google’s contractual restrictions on phone manufacturers — requiring them to install certain apps, in certain settings, if they want other apps; preventing customizations that manufacturers would prefer; requiring manufacturers to set Google Search as the sole and default search provider.

These questions are near and dear to me because, so far as I know, I broke the story of Google’s Mobile Application Distribution Agreement contracts, the previously-secret documents that embody most of the restrictions DG Comp challenges. I described these documents in a February 2014 post:

Google claims that its Android mobile operating system is “open” and “open source”–hence a benefit to competition. Little-known contract restrictions reveal otherwise: In order to obtain key mobile apps, including Google’s own Search, Maps, and YouTube, manufacturers must agree to install all the apps Google specifies, with the prominence Google requires, including setting these apps as default where Google instructs. It’s a classic tie and an instance of full line forcing: If a phone manufacturer wants any of the apps Google offers, it must take the others also.

I offered the HTC MADA and Samsung MADA, both as they stood as of year-end 2010. So far as I know, these are the only MADA’s available on the web to this day; while Google now admits that MADAs exist (a fact unknown to the public before I posted these documents), no one has circulated any newer versions. Occasional news reports discuss new versions, most notably a September 2014 piece from The Information’s Amir Efrati reporting new and growing requirements embodied in “confidential documents viewed by The Information” but unfortunately not available to the public. So the documents I posted remain the best available evidence of the relevant restrictions.

While news reports and the EC SO offer some sense of MADA requirements, there’s no substitute for reading the plain language of the underlying contracts. I cited and quoted key sections in my 2014 piece:

“Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications [listed elsewhere in the agreement] … are pre-installed on the Device.” See MADA section 2.1.

The phone manufacturer must “preload all Google Applications approved in the applicable Territory … on each device.” See MADA section 3.4(1).

The phone manufacturer must place “Google’s Search and the Android Market Client icon [Google Play] … at least on the panel immediately adjacent to the Default Home Screen,” with “all other Google Applications … no more than one level below the Phone Top.” See MADA Section 3.4(2)-(3).

The phone manufacturer must set “Google Search … as the default search provider for all Web search access points.” See MADA Section 3.4(4).

Google’s Network Location Provider service must be preloaded and the default. See MADA Section 3.8(c).

“Naked exclusion” and impeding competition

Competition lawyers offer the term “naked exclusion” for conduct unabashedly intended to exclude rivals, for which a dominant firm offers no efficiency justification. That diagnosis matches my understanding of these tactics, as the MADAs give no suggestion that Google is trying to help consumers or anyone else. Rather, the MADAs appear to be intended to push Google’s own businesses and prevent competitors from getting traction.

Consider the impact on competing firms. Suppose some competing app maker sought to increase use of one of its apps, say Yahoo seeking greater usage of Yahoo Maps. Yahoo might reasonably offer a bonus payment to, say, Samsung as an incentive for featuring the Yahoo Maps app on new phones sold via, say, AT&T. To encourage users to give Yahoo Maps a serious try, Yahoo would want its service to be the only preinstalled mapping app; otherwise, Yahoo would rightly anticipate that many users would discard Yahoo Maps and go straight to the familiar Google Maps. For $2 per phone, Samsung might be happy to remove Google Maps and preinstall Yahoo Maps, figuring any dissatisfied consumer could download Google Maps. And if some of that $2 was passed back to consumers via a lower price for purchasing the phone, consumers might be pleased too. Crucially, Google’s MADA prevents this effort and others like it. In particular, the MADA requirements prevent Samsung from removing any of the listed Google apps, Google Maps key among them. And if Samsung can only offer Yahoo the option to be a second preinstalled mapping app, it’s much less clear that Yahoo is willing to pay. In fact, based on Yahoo’s reasonable projections of user response, there may no longer be a price that Yahoo is willing to pay and Samsung is willing to accept.

The first key effect of the MADAs, then, is that they prevent new entrants and other competitors from paying to get exclusive placement. This impedes competition and entry, and streamlines Google’s dominance.

Meanwhile, the MADAs correspondingly reduce pressure on Google to provide market-leading functionality and quality. Some competing apps might be a little bit better than Google’s offerings, and a phone manufacturer might correctly assess that consumers would prefer those alternatives. But phone manufacturers can’t switch to those offerings because the MADA disallows those changes. This barrier to switching in turn discourages competing app makers from even trying to compete. After all, if they can’t get traction even when their apps are genuinely better, they won’t be able to raise capital and won’t develop the improvements in the first place.

Finally, the MADAs prevent Google from needing to pay to get and retain preferred placements and defaults. On desktop computers, search engines pay to be a browser’s default — giving additional revenue to a computer manufacturer, and reducing device cost. But MADAs allow Google to require that it be the default search provider, and require that its apps be preinstalled and prominent, all without payment to phone manufacturers.

Assessing Google’s responses

This week reporters conveyed to me Google’s responses to the EC’s SO. First, Google argued that it is merely requiring that its apps be preinstalled, not ruling out the possibility that other apps may be preinstalled too. That defense has three key weaknesses.

  • Some MADA provisions explicitly do require that Google functions be the sole or default in their spheres. Consider the requirement that Google Search be the default search provider for all Web search access points (MADA Section 3.4(4)) and the requirement that Google’s Network Location Provider service must be preloaded and default (MADA Section 3.8(c)). One can hardly overstate the importance of these two functions. Search is the most natural way to monetize users’ activities and is the natural gateway to other functions and services. Meanwhile, location providers are the crucial translation between a phone’s sensors and its inferences about the user’s geographic location — collecting and aggregating location data with exceptional commercial value though of course also special privacy consequences. In these two crucial areas, Google does exactly what its defense claims it does not — requiring not only that its services be installed, but that they be installed as the sole and exclusive default. We are fortunate to be able to read the MADAs (HTC, Samsung) to see these requirements embodied in contract language.
  • The possibility of a more intrusive restriction does nothing to deny the harm from the approach Google chose. Google sketches a different restriction on competition that would cause even larger harm — requiring not just preinstallation of Google apps but explicit contractual exclusion of competitors. But the possibility of a worse alternative does not mean Google’s approach is permitted.
  • Google’s argument runs counter to settled European competition law. Consider experience from prior EC proceedings against Microsoft. Microsoft always allowed OEM’s to install other web browsers and other media players. Nonetheless Microsoft faced EC penalties for requiring that OEM’s include Microsoft’s browser and media player. The law of the land, for better or for worse, is that dominant firms may not invoke this approach.

Second, Google told reporters that its tactics are necessary to protect the health of the Android ecosystem and to build and retain consumer trust. But this argument strains credibility. Would the Android ecosystem truly be less reliable or trustworthy if some phones came with, say, Yahoo Maps? The better assessment is that Google imposes MADA restrictions to advance its business interests. To evaluate these alternative understandings of Google’s conduct, one might depose Google employees or better yet read contemporaneous documents. Beginning in 2010, Skyhook litigation revealed some of Google’s internal email discussions in this area, revealing reveal that their purpose is competitive — “using compatibility as a club to make them [phone makers] do things we want.” Further evidence against Google’s ecosystem/trust argument comes from Android’s other notable ecosystem weaknesses — from brazenly counterfeit apps to confusingly inconsistent user interfaces. Allowing those problems to fester for years, Google cannot plausibly claim significant consumer confusion or ecosystem harm from, say, a competing maps app clearly labeled as such.

Third, Google argued that dissatisfied phone manufacturers can always install core Android without any Google Mobile Services and hence without the MADA obligations. But this approach ignores commercial realities. In wealthy markets such as the EC and the US, few customers would accept an Android phone without Google Play, the app store necessary to install other apps. Without Google Play, consumers cannot get the Facebook app, the Pandora, Uber, and so on. Such a limited phone would be a nonstarter for mainstream users. Amazon’s Fire flop reveals that even Amazon, with a trusted name and distinctive positioning, could not offer a viable phone without Google Play access to install other apps. Conversely, consider how much more attractive users would have found Fire had they been able to use Google Play to get the benefit of third-party apps alongside the distinctive features Amazon provided. But Google’s MADA exactly prohibited that approach — converting a promising potential competitor into a weakling that quickly collapsed.

Looking ahead

One crucial next step is discussion of remedies — what exactly Google must do in order to correct the distortions its MADAs have created. Bloomberg reports Google reducing the number of apps phone manufacturers are required to preinstall and feature — but dropping losers like Google Plus is just tinkering around the edges.

The obvious first step is that Google should withdraw the MADA restrictions. With no more MADA, phone manufacturers could take the distinct Google apps that they want, and not others. Google has no proper reason to prevent a phone manufacturer from combining Google Play with, say, Yahoo Maps and Bing Search. Indeed, with Google’s search dominance increasingly protected from competition as Yahoo stumbles and Microsoft withdraws, these combinations are the most promising way to increase competition in mobile.

Next, it goes nearly without saying that Google should pay a substantial penalty. Billion-dollar fines have become routine in Europe’s competition cases against American tech giants, including for conduct far less brazen and less obviously calculated to impede competition. Anything less at this point would seem to be a slap on the wrist undermining the importance of the EC’s effort.

Most of all, a full remedy requires affirmative efforts to undo the harm from Google’s years of improper conduct. After Microsoft’s browser tactics were deemed unlawful, the company was for five years obliged to present a “ballot box” in which consumers affirmatively chose among the five most popular browsers — presented in random order with no default. It’s easy to envision a similar approach in mobile: Upon first activating a new smartphone, a user would choose among the top five maps apps, top five search engines, top five geolocation services, and so forth. These obligations would most naturally track all the verticals that Google has targeted through its MADA restrictions. As users saw these options, competing app makers would get a prominent opportunity to attract users at modest expense — beginning to restore the competition that Google has improperly foreclosed.

Finally, a remedy should undo the secrecy Google has imposed. I wrote in 2014 about the remarkable steps required to obtain the MADAs — documents whose very existence was purportedly confidential, and whose terms contradicted the public statements (and sworn testimony) of Google’s leaders. This secrecy prevented app developers, competitors and the general public from knowing and debating Google’s tactics and raising concerns for a prompt regulatory response. Furthermore, secrecy emboldened Google to invoke methods that would have been less attractive had they been subject to public scrutiny from the outset. As part of competition proceedings, Google should be compelled to publish key contracts, facilitating analysis and discussion by the interested public. Meanwhile, as John Gapper writes in the FT, it’s ironic for Google to claim that EU officials “could be better informed” when Google itself limits distribution of the most important documents.

Spontaneous Deregulation: How to Compete with Platforms That Ignore the Rules

Edelman, Benjamin, and Damien Geradin. “Spontaneous Deregulation: How to Compete with Platforms That Ignore the Rules.” Harvard Business Review 94, no. 4 (April 2016): 80-87.

Many successful platform businesses–think Airbnb, Uber, and YouTube–ignore laws and regulations that appear to preclude their approach. The rule-flouting phenomenon is something we call “spontaneous private deregulation,” and it is not new. Benign or otherwise, spontaneous deregulation is happening increasingly rapidly and in ever more industries. This article surveys incumbents’ vulnerabilities and identifies possible responses.

When Your Competitors Ignore the Law

Last fall I flagged the problem of transportation network companies (Uber and kin) claiming a cost advantage by ignoring legal requirements they considered ill-advised or inconvenient. But the problem stretches well beyond TNCs. Consider Airbnb declining to enforce (or, often, even tell hosts about) the insurance, permitting, tax, zoning, and other requirements they must satisfy in order to operate lawfully. Or Zenefits using selling insurance via staff not trained or certified to do so (and, infamously, helping some staff circumvent state-mandated training requirements). Or Theranos offering a novel form of blood tests without required certification, yielding results that federal regulators found “deficient” and worse. The applicable requirements may be clear — get commercial insurance before driving commercially; be zoned for commercial activities if you want to rent out a room; be trained and licensed to sell insurance if you intend to do so. Yet a growing crop of startups decline to do so, finding it faster and more expedient to seek forgiveness rather than permission. And the approach spreads through competition: once one firm in a sector embraces this method, others have to follow lest they be left behind.

A first question is how violations should be sanctioned. I’ve long thought that penalties could appropriately be severe. Consider the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s $49 million civil penalty against Uber for its intentional operation in violation of a PUC order. The PUC discussed the purpose of this penalty: “not just to deter Uber, but also [to deter] other entities who may wish to launch … without Commission approval.” Their rationale is compelling: If the legal system requires a permit for Uber’s activity, and if we are to retain that requirement, sizable penalties are required to reestablish the expectation that following the law is indeed compulsory. Now suppose every state and municipality were to impose a penalty comparable in size. Despite Uber’s wealth, the numbers add up — 100 such penalties would take $4.9 billion from Uber’s investors, a sizable share of Uber’s valuation and plausibly more than the company’s cash on hand.

Meanwhile, competitors are compelled to respond. For a typical taxi fleet owner or driver, or anyone else trying to compete with a law-breaking entrant, it’s little answer to hope that regulators may some day impose penalties. (And indeed there’s scant evidence that Pennsylvania’s approach will prevail more broadly.) What to do? Damien Geradin and I offer a menu of suggestions in two recent articles:

Spontaneous Deregulation: How to compete with platforms that ignore the rules – Harvard Business Review

Competing with Platforms that Ignore the Law – HBR Online

To Groupon or Not to Groupon: The Profitability of Deep Discounts

Edelman, Benjamin, Sonia Jaffe, and Scott Duke Kominers. “To Groupon or Not to Groupon: The Profitability of Deep Discounts.” Marketing Letters 27, no. 1 (March 2016): 39-53. (First circulated in June 2011. Featured in Working Knowledge: Is Groupon Good for Retailers? Excerpted in HBR Blogs: To Groupon or Not To Groupon: New Research on Voucher Profitability.)

We examine the profitability and implications of online discount vouchers, a relatively new marketing tool that offers consumers large discounts when they prepay for participating firms’ goods and services. Within a model of repeat experience good purchase, we examine two mechanisms by which a discount voucher service can benefit affiliated firms: price discrimination and advertising. For vouchers to provide successful price discrimination, the valuations of consumers who have access to vouchers must generally be lower than those of consumers who do not have access to vouchers. Offering vouchers tends to be more profitable for firms which are patient or relatively unknown, and for firms with low marginal costs. Extensions to our model accommodate the possibilities of multiple voucher purchases and firm price re-optimization. Despite the potential benefits of online discount vouchers to certain firms in certain circumstances, our analysis reveals the narrow conditions in which vouchers are likely to increase firm profits.

Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies like Airbnb and Uber?

Edelman, Benjamin, and Damien Geradin. “Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies like Airbnb and Uber?” Stanford Technology Law Review 19, no. 2 (2016): 293-328.

New software platforms use modern information technology, including full-featured web sites and mobile apps, to allow service providers and consumers to transact with relative ease and increased trust. These platforms provide notable benefits including reducing transaction costs, improving allocation of resources, and creating information and pricing efficiencies. Yet they also raise questions of regulation, including how regulation should adapt to new services and capabilities, and how to correct market failures that may arise. We explore these challenges and suggest an updated regulatory framework that is sufficiently flexible to allow software platforms to operate and deliver their benefits, while ensuring that service providers, users, and third parties are adequately protected from harm that may arise.

Android and Competition Law: Exploring and Assessing Google’s Practices in Mobile

Edelman, Benjamin, and Damien Geradin. “Android and Competition Law: Exploring and Assessing Google’s Practices in Mobile.” European Competition Journal 12, nos. 2-3 (2016): 159-194.

Since its launch in 2007, Android has become the dominant mobile device operating system worldwide. In light of this commercial success and certain disputed business practices, Android has come under substantial attention from competition authorities. We present key aspects of Google’s strategy in mobile, focusing on Android-related practices that may have exclusionary effects. We then assess Google’s practices under competition law and, where appropriate, suggest remedies to right the violations we uncover.

The Design of Online Advertising Markets

Edelman, Benjamin. “The Design of Online Advertising Markets.” Chap. 15 in The Handbook of Market Design, edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Because the market for online advertising is both new and fast-changing, participants experiment with all manner of variations. Should an advertiser’s payment reflect the number of times an ad was shown, the number of times it was clicked, the number of sales that resulted, or the dollar value of those sales? Should ads be text, images, video, or something else entirely? Should measurement be performed by an ad network, an advertiser, or some intermediary? Market participants have chosen all these options at various points, and prevailing views have changed repeatedly. Online advertising therefore presents a natural environment in which to evaluate alternatives for these and other design choices. In this piece, I review the basics of online advertising, then turn to design decisions as to ad pricing, measurement, incentives, and fraud.

Discrimination Against Airbnb Guests with Michael Luca and Dan Svirsky

To facilitate trust, many online platforms encourage sellers to provide personal profiles and even to post pictures of themselves. However, these features may also facilitate discrimination based on sellers’ race, gender, age, or other characteristics.

In an article posted today, Michael Luca, Dan Svirsky, and I present results of a field experiment on Airbnb. Using guest accounts that are identical save for names indicating varying races, we submitted requests to more than 6,000 hosts. Requests from guests with distinctively African-American names are roughly 16% less likely to be accepted than identical guests with distinctively White names. The difference persists whether the host is African American or White, male or female. The difference also persists whether the host shares the property with the guest or not, and whether the property is cheap or expensive.

Discrimination is costly for hosts who indulge in it. Hosts who reject African-American guests are able to find a replacement guest only 35% of the time.

On the whole, our analysis suggests a need for caution. While information can facilitate transactions, it also facilitates discrimination. Airbnb’s site carefully shrouds information Airbnb wants to conceal, such as hosts’ email addresses and phones numbers, so guests can’t contact hosts directly and circumvent Airbnb’s fees. But when it comes to information that facilitates discrimination, including name and photo, Airbnb offers no such precaution.

Our working paper:

Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment.

What to do? Our draft suggests several ways Airbnb could change its site to reduce or prevent discrimination, including concealing guest names, concealing or deprioritizing guest photos, and increasing instant bookings. In the short run, we’re offering a browser plugin to let interested Airbnb users experience the site without information that may facilitate discrimination. Using our plugin, a host can view a guest’s request without having to see the guest’s face or name. Our plugin:

Debias Yourself.

This article extends and continues the research in my January 2014 working paper (with Michael Luca) as to discrimination against Airbnb hosts: Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com.