Status: Pending.
Summary: Federal regulation favors private resolution of disputes between passengers and airlines. But Southwest’s “class waiver” disallows passengers from gathering together with a single set of lawyers and experts for efficient, cost-effective group resolution of their complaints.
Complaint. Answer. Reply. Surreply.
Status: Pending.
Summary: Governing regulation requires an airline to provide the exact price for a passenger’s first and second checked bag within the text of an eticket confirmation email, but Alaska did not do so. Furthermore, the regulation requires bag allowance and price information in a booking summary page, but again Alaska did not. Meanwhile Alaska’s Manage Trip page provided an incorrect statement of baggage benefits and fees.
Complaint. Answer. Reply. Surreply.
Status: Pending.
Summary: The American Airlines Business Extra site misrepresented carrier surcharges as “tax” in violation of governing regulation and prior DOT consent decrees. Furthermore, the site listed “approx” charges rather than the exact amount to be paid. And contrary to governing regulation, the site entirely omitted carrier surcharges from initial fare quotes.
The Brookings Institution‘s Global Goliaths: Multinational Corporations in the 21st Century Economy includes my chapter Multinationals in the Digital Economy. The lead paragraph:
Modern digital services largely come from multinational corporations (MNCs) whose size and scope are unprecedented. It has not always been this way. Just a few decades ago, users typically turned to local firms for most kinds of information technology (IT). And, historically, software was known for its low barriers to entry and the quick rise of startups and small firms. This chapter examines the forces contributing to the rise of digital MNCs, as well as the challenges they face.
Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism, Symposium for John Perry Barlow, 18 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 97.
As part of Duke Technology Law Review‘s Symposium for John Perry Barlow, I reflected on the perspective of early Internet luminary John Perry Barlow, the vision he offered, and what I see as the most promising sources of accountability for online behavior. My piece begins:
Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace calls for a “civilization of the mind in cyberspace,” and he says it will be “more humane and fair” than what governments have created. Barlow’s vision is unapologetically optimistic, easily embraced by anyone who longs for better times to come. Yet twenty years later, it’s easy to see some important respects in which reality fell short of his vision. Alongside the Internet’s many pluses are clickbait, scams, hacks, and all manner of privacy violations. Ten thousand hours of cat videos may be delightful, but they’re no civilization of the mind. With a bit of hindsight, Barlow’s techno-utopianism looks as stilted as other utopianism—and equally far removed from reality.
Beyond being overly optimistic about how perfectly the ‘net would unfold, Barlow was also needlessly skeptical of plausible institutions to bring improvements. He writes: “The only law that all our constituent cultures would generally recognize is the Golden Rule.” But the moral suasion—and practical effectiveness—of the Golden Rule presupposes participants of roughly equal power and status. It is no small feat to meaningfully consider what Joe User might want from Mega Social Network if the tables were turned and Joe owned the goliath. As a practical matter, any claim a user has against a goliath requires state institutions to adjudicate and enforce. When Barlow wrote A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, tech goliaths were much smaller. Plus, the Internet’s early users were in a certain sense more sophisticated than the mainstream users who eventually joined. So the gap from little to big was much narrower then, arguably making governments less important in that era. But as the big get bigger and as the Internet attracts average users who lack the special sophistication of early adopters, governments play key roles—adjudicating disputes, enforcing contracts and beyond.
Flowers, et al. v. Twilio, Inc. is a consumer class action alleging that Twilio recorded phone calls and text messages for its customers Handy Technologies and Homejoy and text messages for its customer Trulia, without the consent of all parties to those communications, in violation of California privacy law.
The parties reached a settlement which received final approval by the Court on June 11, 2019. Persons included in the settlement will be eligible to receive a portion of the settlement fund based on whether their recorded communication(s) involved a phone call or only text messages.
Payments to Class Members will be distributed pro rata based on the type of recorded communication. Each Settlement Class Member who had only a text message recorded by Defendant will receive one share, while each Settlement Class Member who had at least one telephone call recorded by Defendant will receive eight shares. The value of one share will be determined by dividing the net settlement fund by the total number of shares allocated to the Settlement Class. The Settlement Administrator estimates that a Class Member with a recorded phone call will receive $64.30 and a Class Member with only a recorded text message will receive $8.04. This is only an estimate and may change as the Settlement awards are finalized. if the Settlement administrator has the correct mailing address for a Class Member, that Class Member will automatically receive his or her share of the Settlement.
Case documents (including Complaint and Class Notice) are available at the settlement website, californiarecordingsettlement.com.
Checks were first mailed out in September 2019 and those expired on December 16, 2019.
In February 2020, the Court approved re-issuing checks to settlement class members who did not cash the first round of settlement checks in 2019. Those checks were re-issued on March 10, 2020 and will expire on June 8, 2020.
If you received one of these re-issued checks, you must cash it before June 8, 2020 to ensure you get your share of the settlement. After June 8, 2020, any uncashed settlement checks will be voided and cancelled.
Do not attempt to cash any settlement checks after the void or expiration date listed on the check, or you may be subject to bank fees. If you still have an uncashed settlement check issued in 2019, you should not attempt to cash it.
If you have any questions about a re-issued settlement check, you can email or call Class Counsel at recordingsettlement@gbdhlegal.com or 1-800-531-4446. You can also contact the Settlement Administrator at Flowers v. Twilio Settlement Administrator, P.O. Box 404103, Louisville, KY 40233-4103.
Benjamin Edelman and Damien Geradin. An Introduction to the Competition Law and Economics of ‘Free’. Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International. August 2018.
Many of the largest and most successful businesses today rely on providing services at no charge to at least a portion of their users. Consider companies as diverse as Dropbox, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, The Guardian, Wikipedia, and the Yellow Pages.
For consumers, it is easy to celebrate free service. At least in the short term, free services are often high quality, and users find a zero price virtually irresistible.
But long-term assessments could differ, particularly if the free service reduces quality and consumer choice. In this short paper, we examine these concerns. Some highlights:
First, “free” service tends to be free only in terms of currency. Consumers typically pay in other ways, such as seeing advertising and providing data, though these payments tend to be more difficult to measure.
Second, free service sometimes exacerbates market concentration. Most notably, free service impedes a natural strategy for entrants: offer a similar product or service at a lower price. Entrants usually can’t pay users to accept their service. (That would tend to attract undesirable users who might even discard the product without trying it.) As a result, prices are stuck at zero, entry may be more difficult, effectively shielding incumbents from entry.
In this short paper, we examine the competition economics of “free” — how competition works in affected markets, what role competition policy might have and what approach it should take, and finally how competitors and prospective competitors can compete with “free.” Our bottom line: While free service has undeniable appeal for consumers, it can also impede competition, and especially entry. Competition authorities should be correspondingly attuned to allegations arising out of “free” service and should, at least, enforce existing doctrines strictly in affected markets.