Category: advertising

Advertising

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Yahoo syndication fraud litigation

I served as cocounsel in class action litigation challenging Yahoo placing advertisers’ advertisements in low-quality locations such as adware, popups, and typo squatting, while charging advertisers high prices predicated on search advertising.  After motion practice denying Yahoo’s motion to dismiss, Yahoo agreed to cease certain of the practices at issue and allow advertisers to exclude themselves from certain low-quality advertising placements.

In re: Yahoo Litigation, No. 06-2737-CAS (C.D. Cal.)

Case docket including consolidated second amended class action complaint and settlement agreement

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Critiquing ITSA’s Pro-Adware Policy

These days, few advertisers defend “adware” advertising. It seems the world has largely noticed: Consumers hate adware-delivered popup ads. It’s rare that any consumer intentionally installs adware with an accurate understanding of what lies ahead. Since consumers don’t want adware, adware vendors get onto users’ computers by trickery and deception, without appropriate disclosures and informed consent. Problems plague even those vendors that claim to have reformed. (Recall Claria soliciting installations through other vendors nonconsensually-installed spyware and removing important phrases from its disclosures.)

Despite the rising backlash against adware, the Interactive Travel Services Association recently offered a rare contrary view. In its Statement Regarding the Use of Marketing Software Applications (PDF), ITSA effectively endorsed adware. ITSA claims adware “can be useful to many consumers because it provides timely, relevant and money-saving information.” Despite the bad consumer experience and lousy value proposition, ITSA goes on to say adware advertising is just fine, under strikingly vague and weak conditions.

My challenge to ITSA executives: Install Direct Revenue “adware” on your PCs for a month. Then report how much time and money you save.

I don’t understand why ITSA published these guidelines. Certainly I see why ITSA members want to discuss the problem of adware, and why they want to come to a joint decision on stopping bad advertising practices. After all, Expedia would understandably hesitate to stop targeting (say) Orbitz, if there was reason to worry Orbitz would keep running ads that target Expedia. This prisoner’s-dilemma problem calls for the intervention of a trade association, and ITSA seems a natural choice. But the right result from such intervention is to prohibit these bad practices and enforce members’ future compliance — not to sugar-coat the problem.

ITSA members aren’t gaining anything from adware. To the contrary, they pay big fees to adware vendors, but they’re often just trading customers who are already at ITSA member sites. Expedia would be better served by a policy that prevents Orbitz and Travelocity from stealing its traffic, in exchange for a reciprocal promise that Expedia will behave accordingly. Such a policy would serve consumers too, by reducing the funding available to adware vendors and limiting their incentives to sneak onto users’ PCs. That’s the approach I’d like to see from ITSA.

If ITSA is up for a challenge, it could focus on getting travel vendors’ ads out of adware — starting with its own members. ITSA member Cendant owns Cheap Tickets, Howard Johnson, and Super 8 — all three of which are still advertising with Direct Revenue. So is Travelocity. (All confirmed just yesterday, March 30.) Yesterday I also saw Cendant’s Budget Rent A Car still advertising with 180solutions, and Travelocity and Orbitz advertising with Hotbar. Is this what the new ITSA policy will bring? More advertisers for 180solutions, Direct Revenue, and Hotbar, but now with an ITSA stamp of approval? In my view, ITSA should focus on cleaning up its members’ practices, rather than singing adware vendors’ praises.

As best I can tell, adware vendors are the only group that benefits from ITSA’s new policy. No wonder 180solutions endorses ITSA’s approach.

See also criticism from travel expert and consumer advocate Christopher Elliott.

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How Expedia Funds Spyware

Unwanted advertising programs — typically called spyware — are funded by thousands of the world’s largest companies and most respected advertisers. Ask most of these advertisers about their support for spyware, and they’ll say they didn’t know. After all, their affiliates might have bought the ads. Their outsourced advertising placement firms might have made the decisions. Or pay-per-click search engines (including Google and Yahoo) might have syndicated their ads to spyware vendors, without advertisers’ knowledge or consent. (Details: Google, Yahoo)

But a few advertisers have the gall to defend advertising through spyware. Earlier this year, the Associated Press asked Expedia about its support for spyware. Expedia’s spokesman responded:

“It is just a marketing tool that we use.”

Expedia subsequently claimed to have “rigorous standards” for advertising software, including “mak[ing] sure customers want [the] ads.”

Despite Expedia’s claims of user consent, Expedia advertises with numerous programs that don’t get user consent at all.

Expedia Supports 180solutions, Direct Revenue, and eXact Advertising

The screenshots below show Expedia ads shown by the vendors listed at right. Below each vendor’s name are potentially-objectionable practices of that vendor — practices observed currently or in recent months. In each instance, practices include installation through security holes, with no notice or consent.

All ads were observed in September 2005. Click an ad to see a full-size screenshot with additional commentary.

An Expedia popup shown by 180solutions when I browsed to aa.com.  

180solutions (Zango / 180search Assistant)
An Expedia popunder shown by Direct Revenue when I browsed to jetblue.com. Shown after activation of the popunder.

Direct Revenue (Aurora, Ceres, etc.)
An Expedia popunder shown by eXact Advertising when I browsed to jetblue.com. Shown after activation of the popunder.

eXact Advertising (BullsEye)

Intermediaries Placing and Tracking Expedia’s Spyware Ads

Comments from Expedia staff indicate that Expedia is aware of its relationships with “adware” vendors. Nonetheless, advertising intermediaries help facilitate, track, and fund these relationships. Users may therefore place some blame on advertising intermediaries.

In my May analysis of intermediaries helping to fund spyware, I offered as an example an Expedia ad served by 180solutions via aQuantive’s Atlas Solutions.

Other Expedia ads flow through other intermediaries, although each of the ads shown above ultimately reaches Expedia via Atlas Solutions. For example, the ad shown by eXact also passes through Xctrk.com (SearchBoss) and 24/7 Real Media before reaching Atlas.

Although spyware traffic reaches Expedia through advertising intermediaries, Expedia’s servers receive detailed information about the sources of newly-arrived users referred through spyware advertising. For example, see the partial screenshot below, showing an Expedia popup delivered by 180solutions, covering American Airlines at aa.com. Notice that the URL to Expedia includes the string “metdr” in the URL bar. “Metdr” is an abbreviation for MetricsDirect, 180’s advertising sales unit. The presence of this text in Expedia’s URL indicates Expedia’s specific knowledge that the ad is coming from 180solutions. Under these circumstances, Expedia cannot claim to be unaware that it is supporting 180solutions. My full ad screenshots present similar tracking codes in Expedia’s ads as shown by other spyware vendors.

What Expedia Should Do

While Expedia continues advertising with notorious spyware vendors, other major advertisers have ceased relationships with such vendors and publicly voiced their disapproval of these vendors’ practices. In June 2004, Major League Baseball announced (paid registration required)) that it won’t work with companies who use spyware — specifically mentioning unwanted advertisements as a negative consequence of spyware, and thereby seeking to implicate the various vendors Expedia supports. Verizon also said it would cease advertising through what it called “adware.” Wells Fargo staff wrote an op-ed criticizing spyware, noting negative effects of unwanted advertising software on PC reliability as well as on web site integrity. More recently, Netflix announced its intention to cease such advertising (though in my testing, some Netflix ads are still distributed through the vendors listed above, often intermediated through Netflix’s affiliate program).

Expedia’s recent comments to the Associated Press propose an appropriate initial standard — that ads shouldn’t be shown to users through advertising software users didn’t agree to install. But if Expedia aspires to enforce this standard, it needs to better examine how advertising software actually becomes installed. As indicated by the many links above, spyware researchers have uncovered numerous nonconsensual installations of the very programs Expedia currently supports. Expedia staff should review industry sources and perhaps even conduct hands-on tests of their own, to make sure the vendors Expedia supports are not vendors that install without consent or otherwise engage in undesired practices.

These lessons also apply to other large travel sites. In my testing, travel ads appear particularly frequently through spyware, and in the course of recent testing, I received spyware-delivered ads promoting Cheaptickets, Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, Priceline, and Travelocity. In many instances, these vendors hire spyware to target each other — e.g. Travelocity might buy ads that cover Priceline’s site, but once a user reaches Travelocity, a new Priceline pop-up ad will pull the consumer right back. These many spyware-delivered ads entail large payments from travel services (and ultimately the consumers who fund them) to spyware vendors. The online travel industry would surely be better off if all firms agreed to cease this aggressive spyware-delivered advertising. By reducing funding of spyware, such an agreement would offer substantial benefits to consumers too.

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Intermediaries’ Role in the Spyware Mess updated May 28, 2005

When unwanted programs (“spyware” and others) sneak onto users’ computers, their main goal is often to show extra ads, typically pop-ups. If a vendor’s program steals users’ credit card numbers or social security numbers, the vendor will get in real trouble. But, historically, software vendors have been able to show extra ads with impunity.

Where do these ads come from? What companies are willing to support the advertising software that users so despise? It turns out some of the world’s biggest companies are advertising in this way. In 2003, I posted a list of some of Gator’s then-biggest advertisers, work that PC Pitstop updated in 2003 (using Claria’s S1 filing). More recently, I’ve posted a list of substantially all eXact advertising advertisers. More to come.

These advertisers aren’t working in a vacuum. To the contrary, many of their ads appear through spyware only thanks to major ad intermediaries that facilitate and track those placements, and that assist in the associated payments.

Are ad intermediaries responsible when their ads are shown by software installed improperly? Marquette law professor Eric Goldman thinks not. But the New York Attorney General’s office has repeatedly suggested they might be. My take: Advertiser and intermediary liability is an interesting question of law, well beyond my aspirations for this brief piece. But where ad intermediaries purport to certify or stand behind the quality of the venues where their ads are shown, I’m not receptive to their claims that they can’t do what they’ve promised. Where ad intermediaries merely count advertisement clicks without even claiming to assure traffic quality, the case for blaming intermediaries for improper use of their tracking links may be somewhat weaker (though still cognizable).

One fact about which there is no reasonable dispute: Spyware would be far less profitable — and there would be far less of it trying to sneak onto users’ PCs — if big advertisers weren’t advertising this way and if big ad intermediaries weren’t helping to facilitate such advertisements.

An Initial Example: Atlas DMT Assisting with Expedia Ads Shown by 180solutions


An Expedia ad shown by 180solutions, via Atlas DMT tracking.An Expedia ad shown by 180solutions, via Atlas DMT tracking

The many relationships in spyware advertising can be quite complicated, all the more so because advertising and payment structures take so many forms. But let me start with a relatively straightforward example: When users visit aa.com (American Airlines) on PCs with advertising software from 180solutions, 180 may show a popup of Expedia’s web site. See inset image at right.

Expedia
(advertiser)
viewers
Atlas DMT
(intermediary)
viewers
  180solutions  

Traffic Flow

Although 180 could show the Expedia site directly, traffic more typically passes through intermediaries like, in this case, aQuantive’s Atlas DMT. In particular, 180 invokes the Atlas tracking link http://expedia.click-url.com/ go/www18epd0600005172ave/ direct/01, which then redirects users to the specified page at Expedia. So users reach Expedia through Atlas, as shown in the diagram at right.

Ads are placed through intermediaries for a variety of reasons. Sometimes intermediaries help to broker the deal — making connections between advertisers and venues where ads can be shown. Some advertisers might not want to do business with 180solutions directly — maybe they haven’t heard of 180, or have heard only bad things; but doing business with Atlas seems reasonable thanks to Atlas’s better reputation. Or perhaps Atlas adds accountability: An advertiser might not trust 180’s record-keeping, but the advertiser might feel confident that Atlas will accurately count how many times each ad was shown. Intermediaries can also provide efficient and centralized payment, reducing administrative costs. Whatever the reason, ads tend to flow through intermediaries — and so intermediaries like Atlas are well-equipped to stop such ads from appearing, if they care to do so.

Of course this Expedia/Atlas example is but one of many. See e.g. a more detailed example I posted in July 2004, showing a 180solutions ad for Hawaiian Airlines ad, also served by Atlas, substantially covering the Delta.com site.

A Case Study: Advertising Intermediaries Supporting 180solutions

Beyond the Expedia ad shown above, I’ve also been looking at all 180’s other ads, along with examining where these ads come from.

For those interested in advertisers supporting unwanted software, 180solutions is a natural place to start. 180solutions is often installed with no consent at all (videos: 1, 2), via misleading promises at kids sites, in poorly-disclosed bundles, and otherwise without appropriate notice and consent — so ads shown by 180 are presumptively unwanted. Meanwhile, my testing confirms that 180solutions tracks what web sites users visit — rightly earning the name “spyware” since 180 installations can be nonconsensual. 180 also attracts attention for its large installed base and substantial venture funding. Crucially, 180’s self-serve advertising sales system, MetricsDirect, lets anyone hire 180 to show a given ad URL when users visit URLs with a given keyword — without so much as speaking to a 180 representative. In combination, these factors make 180 among the worst offenders at showing problematic ads: Bad actors can use 180 to show advertisers’ sites to millions of users, without meaningful scrutiny by 180 and, thanks to ad intermediaries’ tracking systems, sometimes even without advertisers’ knowledge.

Earlier this month, I found that 180solutions tracks a total of 510,211 keywords within the URLs users visit. In my testing, 157,083 of these keywords are actively targeted with ads. A total of 88,388 distinct ads target these keywords. (As expected, many ads target more than one keyword. I measure “distinct ads” based on use of distinct ad URLs.)

Of these 88,388 ads, many pass through well-known intermediaries which serve to facilitate relationships between advertisers and 180; to track views, clicks, or purchases; and/or to track orcoordinate facilitate payment. The listing below gives a summary of the number of ads (of these 88,388) found to be actively loading content from the specified intermediaries. The listing reports only intermediaries associated with 500 or more different 180solutions ads.

Advertising intermediary
     # ads
Traditional banner ad networks / tracking services
Atlas DMT (aQuantive) (NASDAQ: AQNT)
2,666
Adteractive
2,231
DoubleClick (NASDAQ: DCLK)
1,352
FastClick (NASDAQ: FSTC)
513
Affiliate networks
ClickBank
1,054
Commission Junction (including BeFree) (ValueClick) (NASDAQ: VCLK)   
686
Syndicated search engine advertising
Google (NASDAQ: GOOG)
4,678

See disclosure as to Advertising.com (AOL).

Update: I’ve been asked for details about the “actively loading content from” criteria that governs inclusion in the table above. My scripts check for content loaded from an intermediary by looking for redirects, for loading an intermediary’s content in a FRAME or IFRAME, or for use of JavaScript to load arbitrary code from an intermediary. Most of the listed intermediaries primarily use the redirects and FRAME/IFRAME methods. But Google AdSense sites typically use JavaScript to load Google’s inline ads in a JavaScript-created subwindow. What all these practices have in common is that they actually show substantial content from the ad intermediary — not merely (for example) a small text link to an affiliate network.

Do Ad Intermediaries Intend to Support 180?

Multiple advertising intermediaries (and some big advertisers) have recently written to me to tell me that they “can’t” track how ads are being shown using their networks and systems. They apparently consider it impossible to track all their ads — so they think they shouldn’t be blamed if they fail, i.e. if their ads are shown through software installed improperly on users’ PCs.

I emphatically disagree. The task is definitely doable. I know because I’ve already done it.

advertisers
money viewers
ad intermediaries
(e.g. Commission Junction)
money viewers
independent intermediaries
(e.g. Top3offers)
money viewers
spyware
(e.g. 180solutions)

Flow of Traffic and Payments

Ad intermediaries are correct that the design of spyware and similar systems makes their traditional enforcement procedures ineffective. Historically, if an ad intermediary noticed that some client or site was showing its ads in a way the intermediary didn’t like, the intermediary could simply cancel the corresponding entity’s contract and withhold payments to that entity or refuse future business from that entity.

180solutions’ design (and others like it) wreaks havoc on this simple enforcement model. Many of 180’s ads are placed by 180 advertisers, acting in their own names, in general without disclosing that the resulting traffic will be shown in 180solutions pop-ups. For example, Top3offers.com pays 180solutions to show Top3offers URLs when users visit certain keywords pertaining to online dating. Top3offers then sends such traffic to Yahoo Personals via a Commission Junction tracking link, ultimately receiving payments for leads or signups. Yahoo and CJ did not request that Top3offers take any such action — and if they search their advertiser databases for 180solutions, they won’t find a match, because the underlying account is in the name of Top3offers, not 180. And of course Top3offers is just one of hundreds — thousands? — of middle-men using similar methods. (See e.g. ten specific examples I posted in detail last year — complete with packet logs, videos, etc.)

So it’s insufficient for ad intermediaries to merely search their databases for the names of known wrongdoers. Rather, rigorous enforcement requires examining actions, not just names. Savvy intermediaries need an enforcement system that monitors ads at trouble spots like 180solutions, that flags suspect ads shown there, and that does not naively assume that bad actors will be truthful in their statements to ad intermediaries. Conveniently, that’s precisely how my ad-tracking robot works — that’s precisely how I generated the table above.

This CJ/Top3offers example is just one of many, and of course facts vary across types of ad intermediaries. Because affiliate networks like Commission Junction generally pay commissions only when users make purchases, they tend to be particularly indiscriminate as to who can place such links and earn such commissions — operating under the mistaken assumption that if a user made a purchase, the traffic must have been legitimate. (They ignore the risk that the ad was improperly shown to the user, without appropriate prior consent.) Indeed, despite CJ having ended its direct relationship with 180, 180’s advertisers (the “independent intermediaries” in the diagram above) continue to run CJ links — apparently in the expectation of continuing to receive payment, i.e. because CJ won’t catch them. If CJ can’t identify and block this traffic, then CJ still earns its commissions on such traffic — so paradoxically CJ still profits from the activities of 180 and its advertisers.

How Google Gets Involved

PPC advertisers
money viewers
   Google (AdWords)   
money viewers
AdSense sites
money viewers
180solutions

Flow of Traffic and Payments via Google

Google’s relationship with 180 proceeds in the convoluted path shown at right. Pay-per-click advertisers pay Google to show their ads on Google’s AdSense partner sites. Some AdSense members then pay 180 to show the members’ sites via 180solutions popups, such that funding ultimately flows as shown at right: From pay-per-click advertiser to Google to AdSense member site to 180solutions. (Example.)

Google’s relationship with 180 merits special discussion for at least two reasons. First, where other intermediaries often withhold from making claims about the quality of the sites they track or serve, Google tells its advertisers that sites showing Google ads are “high-quality” and “reviewed and monitored according to … rigorous standards.” Furthermore, Google’s AdSense Program Policies provide that AdSense ads may not be displayed in pop-ups or via client software (like 180).

Second, notwithstanding Google’s statements about the quality of sites in its network, Google’s relationship with 180 is surprisingly large: Of the 88,388 current 180solutions ads, some 4,678 (5%+) include Google AdSense ads, making Google the most prevalent source of funding for web sites advertising with 180solutions (at least when measured by the methods set out above).

Despite the “quality” claims in Google’s statements to its advertisers, it is unclear what steps Google takes to enforce its stated rules. I sent an inquiry to Google staff two weeks ago, but I have not yet received a response.

That Google AdSense members promote their sites through pop-ups like 180’s is entirely foreseeable. Indeed, Google apparently foresaw this problem when it included AdSense policy text to specifically forbid this practice. Now that the problem is observed and now that it turns out to be substantial, will Google enforce its existing rule?

Update: In a blog entry responding to this piece, Eric Goldman concludes “nothing about traffic to AdSense sites sourced by adware vendors runs contrary to Google’s stated policies.” Perhaps I haven’t explained (what I view to be) the violation sufficiently clearly. So let me try again. First, AdSense Program Policies require that “No Google ad … may be displayed on any … pop-ups” — seemingly violated when 180 shows pop-ups of sites that include AdSense ads. Second, AdSense’s Terms and Conditions provide as follows (emphasis added):

“5. Prohibited Uses. You shall not, and shall not authorize or encourage any third party to … (vi) directly or indirectly access … Ads … through or from … any software application.

My example shows behavior that seems to exactly match the prohibited activity: An AdSense site hires 180 (surely “authoriz[ation]” and “encourage[ment]” within the meaning of the rule) to show the AdSense site, including showing (and thereby “access[ing]”) the site’s AdSense ads, as a result of the 180 software application observing the user viewing certain targeted sites. To me, the inconsistency between this practice and the stated rule seems abundantly clear.

Methodology, Enhancements, and Future Work

For those interested in my methodology: I’ve previously written about how to learn what ads 180 shows when users visit certain sites. The results above are derived from this list of ad URLs by processing with a robot that looks at the contents of each ad URL, attempting to determine and classify any ad networks or other intermediaries forwarding users to other advertising elsewhere.

Because my robots are imperfect, my methods tend to undercount the number of ads actually coming from each ad intermediary. My robots can track and analyze most standard HTML, including server-side redirects, client-side redirects, frames, iframes, and even basic JavaScript. But encoded JavaScript and certain other tricks currently serve to stop my robots from successfully and fully analyzing all ads.

In the coming weeks I’ll be posting more specific data — perhaps a listing of specific ads shown through unwanted software on users’ PCs, passing through some or all of the ad intermediaries listed above; perhaps videos and packets logs examining particular examples in detail. Interested readers should feel free to send suggestions and requests. Note that my March 2005 eXact Advertising testing reported the intermediaries associated with most of eXact’s current ads.

Where Do We Go From Here?

At a recent NAI Spyware conference, advertising executives reportedly discussed “creating robot-like technology to follow … advertisement[s].” They’re on the right track — but it’s unfortunate that they’re still just “discussing” rather than actively moving forward with the work. If I can do the analysis above — using just my ordinary cablemodem, some VB scripts running within Microsoft Access, and a single spare PC in my lab — then surely NAI’s members can do a lot better.

NAI members like aQuantive and DoubleClick are currently placing and tracking thousands of ads that are helping to fund the unwanted software plaguing users’ PCs. The time for talking has long since ended.

Disclosure: I serve as a consultant to AOL on certain matters related to spyware. If AOL’s Advertising.com ads had been sufficiently frequent to meet the criteria for inclusion in the table, I would have included them. However, in fact AOL / Advertising.com serve/track/support substantially less than 500 ads shown by 180solutions, therefore not calling for inclusion in the table. This calculation is based on 180solutions ads as they stood before I sent AOL any report as to its Advertising.com ads being shown by or through 180solutions. To the extent that AOL’s numbers are below those of other ad intermediaries, I attribute this to AOL’s March 2005 decision to stop doing business with all adware companies.

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What Advertisers Use WhenU?



Advertisers Using WhenU

Ever wonder who advertises on WhenU? A few reporters have tried to figure this out but have been stymied: Few companies care to talk about their use of Claria or WhenU. (WSJ [paid registration required], BusinessWeek).

So I thought I’d put together a list of all of WhenU’s current advertisers — all the companies showing graphical ads (not just sponsored link text) on WhenU’s system. There are 234 distinct advertisers, by my count. The biggest advertisers (by advertisement count) are Priceline (51 ads), J.P. Morgan Chase (43), Casino On Net (37), Verizon (28), Orexis (24). Major advertisement categories:

Gambling, Betting and Bingo 327 advertisements 49 advertisers
Loans 263 advertisements 35 advertisers
Travel 213 advertisements 21 advertisers

Further down the list, 102 ads for insurance, 99 for sexual health (mostly Viagra and similar products) and even some ads for online psychics and online cigarette sales.

All the details, and thousands of advertisement thumbnails, are in:

Advertisers Using WhenU

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Dell’s Spyware Puzzle updated June 9, 2004


Dell Ad Displayed using ClariaDell Ad Displayed using Claria

Lots of companies have a puzzling relationship with spyware. For example, a recent eWeek article pointed out the complexities in Yahoo!’s relationship with Claria: My research of last year found that yahoo.com is the the single most targeted domain of the many thousands Claria targets with its context-triggered popups. More recently, Yahoo! released a toolbar that uninstalls Claria software. These facts suggest that Yahoo! would dislike Claria and would actively oppose Claria’s activities. Nonetheless, Yahoo! remains a major supplier to Claria (via Yahoo!’s Overture sponsored link service, which reportedly provides 30% of Claria’s revenue, per Claria’s S-1 filing).

Even more puzzling, Dell both suffers from spyware and receives web traffic from Claria’s advertising services. In recent comments to the FTC (PDF page 70), Dell’s Maureen Cushman reported that spyware is Dell’s “number one call driver” as of late 2003, and that spyware is responsible for as much as 12% of calls to Dell tech support.

Nonetheless, my testing shows that Dell UK ads run on the Claria ad network. See the ad shown at right (among several other ads also from Dell UK), which I received while viewing the IBM.COM site. My further testing indicates that Claria shows several Dell UK ads when users visit the sites listed below (perhaps among others). (Note that users might have to visit particular parts of the sites listed here — i.e. the computers section of amazon.co.uk, not just other parts of the Amazon site.)

ebay.co.uk
hp.com
msn.co.uk
apple.com
amazon.co.uk
ibm.com
kelkoo.co.uk		 bt.com
pricerunner.com
dabs.com
dealtime.co.uk
johnlewis.com
dooyoo.co.uk
comet.co.uk		 ebuyer.com
pcworld.co.uk
dixons.co.uk
acer.co.uk
abrexa.co.uk
sony.co.uk
simply.co.uk		 priceguideuk.com
toxiclemon.co.uk
packardbell.co.uk
microwarehouse.co.uk
evesham.com
toshiba.co.uk		 cclcomputers.co.uk
morgancomputers.co.uk
timecomputers.com
sony-cp.com
europc.co.uk
empiredirect.co.uk

Dell staff tell me that the ads were unauthorized, placed by an affiliate without Dell’s permission. My inspection of the ads (and their link destinations) is consistent with this claim. But my inspection of Claria configuration files further suggests that the ads ran on the Claria network since at least February 6, 2004 — some four months ago. Why didn’t Dell notice this problem until I brought it to their attention?

If this is just a glitch, what procedures could Dell (and other companies) implement to make sure their ads are placed through only authorized channels? I’d be honored to work with interested advertisers to think through the possibilities for automatic or scheduled monitoring, testing, etc.

A note on my research methods: In May-June 2003, I offered a Gator real-time testing service that reported, on request, which ads (if any) targeted a given web site. I have subsequently disabled this site, so it provides only archived data. But I can still provide current Gator targeting data upon request. Interested readers, please get in touch by email.

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Expert Declaration in Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company, LLC, et al. v. the Gator Corporation

I had the honor of preparing two expert declarations in Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company, LLC, et al. v. the Gator Corporation in federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia. My clients were the plaintiffs in the case, including the Washington Post Newsweek Interactive Company, Gannett Satellite Information Network, Media West-GSI, the New York Times Company, the Boston Globe Newspaper Company, Dow Jones, Smartmoney, the Chicago Tribute Interactive, Condenet, American City Business Journals, Cleveland Live, and Knight Riddler Digital.

Soon after my declarations, the case settled, and Gator stopped covering my clients’ sites with its popup advertising and other ads.

My declarations and other case documents.

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Documentation of Gator Advertisements and Targeting

The Gator Corporation designs software to display advertisements on users’ computer screens, triggered in part by the specific web sites users visit. The author has developed an automated method of determining which specific advertisements Gator has associated with which web sites, data that may be helpful to web site operators, policy-makers, and others in assessing Gator’s practices. This article offers listings of more than eight thousand specific sites targeted by Gator as well as analysis of the advertisements shown. An interface is also available to let interested Internet users to test Gator’s advertisements on their own.

Documentation of Gator Advertisements and Targeting